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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This study concentrates on the external trade and 
financial markets of two Asian Newly Industrialized 
Countries (NICs): South Korea and Taiwan. It is composed 
of two parts. The first part examines whether a J-curve 
effect is evident in the trade between the countries of 
South Korea and Taiwan, on the one hand, and the countries 
of the United States, Japan and the rest of the world, on 
the other, over the last twenty years. The second part 
examines how well South Korea's and Taiwan's financial 
markets are integrated with the U.S. and Japanese financial 
markets. A brief introduction to each part is presented in 
this chapter. 
The J-Curve Effect 
It is commonly believed that the real (effective) 
exchange rate is one of the major determinants of a 
country's trade balance. Conventional wisdom on the effect 
of the real exchange rate on the trade balance is described 
by the J-curve effect: a real depreciation worsens a 
country's trade balance in the short run but improves it in 
1 
the long run. The rationale behind this argument is that 
import prices adjust quickly to real exchange rate changes 
(or relative price changes) while import and export volumes 
adjust only slowly. Thus, the initial effect of a real 
depreciation on a country's trade balance is "perverse" 
because total import value increases more than total export 
value increases. In the long run, however, as the import 
and export volumes adjust to the higher (lower) import 
(export) prices, the trade balance will improve. A number 
of empirical tests support the view that, following a real 
depreciation, the trade balance exhibits a "J-curve" 
l 
effect. Rose and Yellen (1989a and 1989b) and Rose (1991a 
and 1991b), on the other hand, question the theoretical 
2 
reasons behind the J-curve effect. Their empirical 
findings show that there is no significant relationship 
between the real exchange rate (and its lags) and the trade 
balance of the major OECD countries. In the first part of 
1 Examples include Goldstein and Khan (1985), Helkie 
and Hooper (1987), and Krugman and Baldwin (1987). Chapter 
II, the literature review, discusses these papers. 
2 Rose and Yellen (1989) argue that no theoretical 
reason leads one to presume that the J-curve effect exist. 
They note that, "· .. while the conditions (i.e. the low 
short-run price elasticities of demand for imports both at 
home and abroad, a swift response of import prices to the 
exchange rate, and a long-run positive effect on trade 
balance of real depreciation) which lead to a J-curve may 
strike some as realistic, the complement (counterpart) to 
this set of hypothesis seems equally plausible." Rose and 
Yellen refer to Mann (1986), who finds that import prices 
adjust slowly to exchange rate changes, to demonstrate that 
the initial negative effect implied by the J-curve may not 
exist. 
2 
3 
the dissertation, I shall adopt the methodology used by Rose 
and Yellen to examine whether the trade between the 
countries of South Korea and Taiwan, on the one hand, and 
the countries of the United States, Japan, and rest of the 
world, on the other, displays a J-curve phenomenon. I shall 
concentrate on Taiwan and South Korea because both economies 
are export oriented and have experienced a significant trade 
surplus (deficit) with the United States (Japan) in recent 
years, as shown in Tables 1-4. 3 In addition, the results 
will be checked for robustness. 
Financial Market Integration 
Since the 1970s, a number of financial liberalization 
policies have been inaugurated by Pacific Basin nations. 
These policies have increased the integration of Pacific 
Basin nations' financial markets into the world financial 
markets. Glick and Hutchison (1990) have shown that, because 
of the financial reforms in Pacific Basin countries, the 
linkages between real interest rates in the United States 
and other Pacific Basin nations have increased over time. 4 
3 A more detailed discussion of the U.S. 
deficit (surplus) with Taiwan and South Korea 
presented in Chapter III. 
(Japan) trade 
will be 
4 Glick (1987) has shown that the linkage of real 
interest rates between the United States and "financial 
liberalizing" Pacific Basin nations (Australia, Hong Kong, 
Japan, Malaysia, and Taiwan) during the 1974-1985 period is 
significantly greater than zero but less than one. Glick and 
Hutchison (1990) show that the linkages of real interest 
rates between the United States and these Pacific Basin 
4 
Frankel and MacArthur (1988) and Frankel (1989) use 
"covered" interest differentials to examine financial market 
integration (or financial capital mobility). Since they 
find that the Covered Interest Parity (CIP) condition holds 
quite well between the interest rates of liberalizing 
Pacific Basin nations (Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, and 
Singapore) and the Eurodollar rate, they conclude that the 
financial markets of these Pacific Basin nations are well 
integrated with the rest of the world financial markets. 
Along with other Pacific Basin nations, Taiwan and 
South Korea have embarked on a liberalization process 
beginning in the early 1980s [see, for example Layman (1988) 
and Kuo (1990)). Although in co~parison to other Pacific 
Basin nations, Taiwan and South Korea begun the 
liberalization process late and proceeded slowly, the 
growing economic importance of these two economies 
necessitates a study of the linkage of their financial 
markets to the international capital markets. In the second 
part of the dissertation, I will use the "uncovered" nominal 
interest rates linkage instead of the real interest rates 
linkage and covered interest differential to examine how 
nations have increased over time in response to the 
financial liberalization process. Because the real interest 
rate linkages are greater than zero, they conclude that the 
economies in Pacific Basin nations are not independent of 
foreign economic conditions. Moreover, because the linkages 
are not complete (less than one), they also claim that 
domestic stabilization policies in these Pacific Basin 
nations are still effective. 
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TABLE 1 
EXCHANGE RATES AND U.S. TRADE BALANCE WITH 
TAIWAN AND SOUTH KOREA 
1970 - 19911 ' 2 
Year U.S.$-N.T.$ U.S.-Taiwan u.s.$-Won U.S.-Korea 
Exchange Rate Trade Balance Exchange Rate Trade Balance 
1970 40.10 -7.57 310.56 88.78 
1971 40.10 -103.01 347.15 72.99 
1972 40.00 -220.48 392.89 9.37 
1973 38.26 -201. 59 398.32 90.59 
1974 38.00 -226.74 404.48 28.40 
1975 38.00 -95.00 484.00 115.39 
1976 38.00 -454.80 484.00 -141. 60 
1977 38.00 -629.40 484.00 -184.10 
1978 37.05 -947.70 484.00 -219.90 
1979 36.05 -875.10 484.00 29.60 
1980 36.01 -852.40 607.43 143.10 
1981 36.85 -1255.80 681. 03 -37.10 
1982 39.12 -1508.30 731. 09 -35.90 
1983 40.07 -2179.10 775.75 -407.50 
1984 39.60 -3254.90 805.98 -1123.40 
1985 39.85 -3898.80 870.02 -1352.30 
1986 37.84 -4755.50 881. 45 -2124.70 
1987 31.84 -5736.30 822.57 -2962.80 
1988 28.59 -4224.30 731. 4 7 -2966.60 
1989 26.41 -4334.20 671. 46 -2087.90 
1990 26.89 -3278.10 707.77 -1364.80 
1991 26.81 -3281.60 733.36 -502.20 
Source: OECD Monthly Trade Statistics, IMF International 
Financial Statistics, and Financial Statistics, Taiwan 
District, R.O.C., various issues. 
1. Exchange rate is nominal and is defined as N.T.$/U.S.$ 
(Won/U.S.$). 
2. The unit of trade balance is million U.S.$. Positive 
(negative) trade balance means the United States has trade 
surplus (deficit) with Taiwan (Korea). 
TABLE 2 
REAL EXCHANGE RATES AND U.S. REAL TRADE BALANCE WITH 
TAIWAN AND SOUTH KOREA 
1970 - 19911 ' 2 
6 
Year U.S.$-N.T.$ 
Exchange Rate 
U.S.-Taiwan 
Trade Balance 
U.S.$-Won 
Exchange Rate 
U.S.-Korea 
Trade Balance 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
48.29 
48.64 
48.30 
48.53 
38.68 
40.13 
40.97 
40.67 
40.40 
40.32 
38.67 
37.03 
38.59 
39.26 
39.72 
39.84 
36.51 
31. 35 
28.92 
26.86 
27.19 
26.23 
-25.53 
-336.92 
-688.21 
-602.81 
-440.31 
-176.99 
-826.57 
-1065.13 
-1522.32 
-1281. 70 
-1052.08 
-1318.62 
-1530.84 
-2176.63 
-3247.29 
-3898.60 
-4719.91 
-5668.95 
-4113.45 
-4047.83 
-3339.09 
-2835.68 
706.55 
717.92 
760.03 
844.03 
819.84 
858.33 
783.08 
748.58 
705.12 
670.67 
746.56 
752.42 
767.93 
798.21 
829.97 
869.97 
833.03 
744.50 
668.51 
609.45 
612.52 
580.03 
568.56 
412.43 
50.56 
439.74 
129.54 
398.63 
-381. 36 
-447.64 
-473.00 
54.39 
203.27 
-29.47 
-39.82 
-426.57 
-1151.05 
-1350.98 
-2067.16 
-2793.73 
-2612.96 
-1741.53 
-1044.98 
-345.86 
Source: Author's own calculations based on data from OECD 
Monthly Trade Statistics, IMF International Financial 
Statistics, and Financial Statistics, Taiwan District, 
R.O.C., various issues. 
1. Exchange rate is real and is defined as (e · P*) / P, 
where e is the nominal excpange rate and is defined as 
N.T.$/U.S.$ (Won/U.S.$), P is foreign (U.S.) WPI, and Pis 
domestic (Taiwan's and South Korea's) CPI. 
2. Trade balance is real and is defined as the nominal trade 
balance divided by domestic (Taiwan's or South Korea's) CPI. 
The unit of trade balance is million U.S.$. Positive 
(negative) trade balance means the United States has trade 
surplus (deficit) with Taiwan (Korea). 
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TABLE 3 
EXCHANGE RATES AND JAPAN TRADE BALANCE WITH 
TAIWAN AND SOUTH KOREA 
1970 - 19911 ' 2 
Year Yen-N.T.$ Japan-Taiwan Yen-Won Japan-Korea 
Exchange Rate Trade Balance Exchange Rate Trade Balance 
1970 .1114 150.52 .863 196.86 
1971 .1150 213.54 .998 194.57 
1972 .1319 223.61 1. 296 184.85 
1973 .1409 250.85 1. 467 192.33 
1974 .1302 353.08 1. 385 362.25 
1975 .1281 337.14 1. 631 313.65 
1976 .1282 363.57 1. 632 296.16 
1977 .1419 422.67 1.808 646.19 
1978 .1772 611.82 2.320 1130.77 
1979 .1651 627.40 2.217 948.40 
1980 .1593 950.30 2.694 780.50 
1981 .1673 958.60 3.092 748.30 
1982 .1572 600.60 2.939 532.30 
1983 .1687 822.90 3.267 866.30 
1984 .1669 925.20 3.395 1001. 90 
1985 .1683 550.60 3.679 1005.00 
1986 .2253 1060.20 5.256 1742.50 
1987 .2201 1417.00 5.693 1725.50 
1988 .2232 1870.70 5.711 1205.50 
1989 .1920 2150.60 4.877 1190.70 
1990 .1865 2311.70 4.909 1915.70 
1991 .1991 2924.00 5.449 2575.10 
Source: OECD Monthly Trade Statistics, IMF International 
Financial Statistics, and Financial Statistics, Taiwan 
District, R.O.C., various issues. 
1. Exchange rate is nominal and is defined as N.T.$/Yen 
(Won/Yen). 
2. The unit of trade balance is million U.S.$. Positive 
(negative) trade balance means Japan has trade surplus 
(deficit) with Taiwan (Korea). 
TABLE 4 
REAL EXCHANGE RATES AND JAPAN REAL TRADE BALANCE WITH 
TAIWAN AND SOUTH J<OREA 
1970 - 19911 ' 
8 
Year Yen-N.T.$ 
Exchange Rate 
.1823 
.1819 
.2007 
.2301 
.1893 
.1821 
.1868 
.1970 
.2263 
.2062 
.1971 
.1805 
.1661 
.1708 
.1686 
.1680 
.2030 
.1902 
.1886 
.1593 
.1517 
.1566 
Japan-Taiwan 
Trade Balance 
Yen-Won 
Exchange 
2.667 
2.689 
3.159 
4.012 
4.011 
3.899 
3.570 
3.624 
3.950 
3.432 
3.810 
3.670 
3.304 
3.472 
3.520 
3.670 
4.638 
4.702 
4.363 
3.613 
3.417 
3.465 
Rate 
Japan-Korea 
Trade Balance 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
126.52 
175.00 
174.84 
178.89 
174.19 
156.73 
165.33 
179.50 
245.67 
229.90 
291. 99 
254.04 
152.88 
205.54 
230.77 
137.63 
262.75 
349.82 
455.44 
501.76 
517.28 
632.44 
312.64 
272.00 
231.01 
233.90 
349.69 
246.75 
201. 96 
395.12 
608.35 
432.21 
278.71 
218.61 
144.10 
226.97 
256.81 
251.22 
423.80 
408.28 
266.04 
248.43 
366.10 
450.98 
Source: Author's own calculations based on data from OECD 
Monthly Trade Statistics, IMF International Financial 
Statistics, and Financial Statistics, Taiwan District, 
R.O.C., various issues. 
. . . * 1. Exchange rate is real and is defined as (e · P) / P, 
where e is the nominal exchange rate and is defined as 
N.T.$/Yen (Won/Yen), p* is foreign (Japan's) WPI, and Pis 
domestic (Taiwan's and South Korea's) CPI. 
2. Trade balance is real and is defined as the nominal trade 
balance divided by domestic (Taiwan's or South Korea's) CPI. 
The unit of trade balance is million U.S.$. Positive 
(negative) trade balance means Japan has trade surplus 
(deficit) with Taiwan (Korea). 
well Taiwan's and South Korea's financial markets are 
integrated with the United States and Japanese financial 
markets. 5 Unlike that of the covered interest 
differential, measuring the uncovered interest rate linkage 
does not require forward exchange rates. Therefore, it can 
be applied to countries such as Taiwan and South Korea, 
where, either an official forward exchange market does not 
exist, or official forward exchange rates are not 
available. 6 Moreover, as the study is focused on financial 
market integration, the uncovered nominal interest rate 
linkage, which focuses solely on the degree of financial 
market integration, is more appropriate than the real 
interest linkage, which shows financial and goods markets 
integration jointly. 
9 
5 The term uncovered interest rate linkage denotes the 
linkage between domestic and (depreciation adjusted) foreign 
nominal interest rate. 
6 Beginning July 1, 1980, authorization has been 
granted for forward exchange transactions in South Korea. 
Its official forward exchange rates, however, are not 
available. Frankel and MacArthur (1988) and Frankel (1989) 
have pointed out the only less developed countries in Asia, 
where forward rate data are available, are Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, and Singapore. 
CHAPTER II 
Literature Review 
This chapter is devoted to discussing previous studies 
of the J-Curve effect and financial market integration 
(liberalization). In particular, those studies which 
concentrate on the East Asian NICs as well as the United 
States and Japan are emphasized. 
The J-Curve Effect 
Goldstein and Khan (1985) provide a detailed survey of 
contemporary trade literature. Their conclusion supports 
the existence of the J-curve effect and the effectiveness of 
expenditure-switching (exchange rate) policies. However, 
they also note that exchange rate policies must work with 
the "lessons" of the absorption approach (i.e. support the 
expenditure-reducing policies) and the monetary approach 
(i.e. control the expansion of domestic money supply) in 
order to be successful. Finally, Goldstein and Khan claim 
that since factors such as the commodity composition of 
trade, the degrees of import and export openness, the degree 
of capacity utilization, and the degree of real wage 
resistance are different among countries, the effectiveness 
10 
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of exchange rate changes are not equal across countries. 
Helkie and Hooper (1987) present an empirical analysis 
of the factors which contributed to the unprecedented U.S. 
trade deficit in the first half of the 1980s. Using a 
partial-equilibrium current account model, they find that 
the decline in U.S. price competitiveness (associated with 
the appreciation of the dollar) is the dominant factor 
behind the U.S. trade deficit. They also draw on the 
results of an international macroeconomic model simulation 
to examine how the shifts of U.S. and other industrial 
countries' fiscal policies have contributed to the U.S. 
external deficit. Their analysis finds that the fiscal 
expansions (contractions) in the United States (foreign 
countries) in the first part of 1980's have contributed 
significantly to the rise of U.S. trade deficit during that 
. d 7 perio . In their paper, Helkie and Hooper provide four 
reasons to explain the lack of improvement in the U.S. trade 
balance even in the first half of 1986, following the real 
depreciation of the U.S. dollar beginning in early 1985. 
First, cutting of profit margins by foreign exporters 
7 Helkie and Hooper argue that over 50% of the rise of 
U.S. trade deficit in the first part of 1980s is due to the 
fiscal expansion (contraction) in the U.S. (foreign 
countries) during that period. However, based on model 
simulation, they note that the shifts in fiscal policy does 
not explain all of the real appreciation of the dollar. 
They point out other factors (e.g. changes in monetary 
policy) may have increased the relative attractiveness of 
dollar denominated assets and caused the appreciation of 
U.S. dollar during that period. 
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increases foreign goods' competitiveness. Second, because 
of the recognition-response and order-delivery lags, it 
takes import and export volumes two or more years to adjust 
to price changes. Third, due to the J-Curve effect, the 
import prices rise before import volumes fall, the initial 
effect of real depreciation of U.S. dollar is the 
deterioration of the U.S. trade balance. Finally, the sharp 
appreciation of the dollar in 1984 and the first two months 
of 1985, which, because of the lags involved, offset the 
gains of the dollar's decline that began in March 1985 (at 
least through mid-1986). 
Krugman and Baldwin (1987) assert that the real 
depreciation of the U.S. dollar is effective in improving 
the U.S. trade balance. They take issue with the Mundell-
McKinnon view, which states that the trade balance is 
determined by the difference between national income and 
national expenditure (or saving and investment) and is 
8 
unrelated to the exchange rate. Krugman and Baldwin also 
cite three reasons as to why the real depreciation of the 
U.S. dollar beginning in early 1985 did not improve the U.S. 
trade balance till the end of 1986. First, due to the 
8 They cite two papers as representing the Mundell-
McKinnon argument: Robert A. Mundell, "A New Deal on 
Exchange Rates," paper presented at Japan-United States 
Symposium on Exchange Rates and Macroeconomics (Tokyo, 
Japan, January 29-30, 1987) and Ronald I. McKinnon and 
Kenichi Ohno, "Getting the Exchange Rate Right: Insular 
versus Open Economies,'' paper presented at the meeting of 
the American Economic Association, December 1986. 
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substantial lags in the adjustments of prices and quantities 
to the exchange rate changes, the trade balance will be 
improved some time later (in 1987). Second, because foreign 
demand had not grown as rapidly as U.S. demand since 1980, 
the dollar needed to fall below its 1980 level to restore 
the 1980 trade position. Third, because of the diminishing 
U.S. productivity and technological advantage over competing 
countries (especially those countries in East Asia), a 
secular depreciation of the U.S. dollar may be necessary to 
maintain the price competitiveness of U.S. exports and 
eliminate the U.S. trade deficit. 
Bahmani-Oskooee (1985) estimated a trade balance 
equation for four less developed countries (Greece, South 
Korea, India, and Thailand), using quarterly data for the 
1973-1980 period. By imposing an Almon lag structure on the 
real exchange rate variable (which is defined as nominal 
exchange rate divided by domestic wholesale price level), he 
found that a J-Curve effect exists in Greece, South Korea, 
and India. However, the cumulative (long-run) effect of the 
real depreciation was detrimental to the trade balance in 
those three countries. 
Hickok and Klitgaard (1988) examined different factors 
affecting U.S. export and import growth rates with Taiwan 
and South Korea. They found that the real appreciation of 
New Taiwan dollar (N.T.$) and Korea Won were the major 
factor behind the strength (moderation) in U.S. exports to 
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(imports from) Taiwan and South Korea between mid-1987 and 
mid-1988 period. Other important factors were the import 
liberalization measures and domestic economic growth in 
Taiwan and South Korea (which increase U.S. exports) and the 
problems in specific consumer goods industries in the United 
States (which reduce U.S. imports)._ 
Moreno (1989) employs aggregate data to examine how 
relative prices affect Taiwan's and South Korea's import and 
export volume for the period 1974-1987. Although he finds 
that current (first differenced) relative prices (of import 
and export) have no significant effect on import and export 
volume, the lagged (but not differenced) relative prices 
9 have a significant (and expected) negative effect. Moreno 
also shows that (the favorable) changes in relative prices 
in Taiwan and South Korea have contributed to the trade 
1 ' b th , lO surp uses 1n o economies. 
Noland (1989) uses a generalized gamma distributed lag 
9 . 
In the study, Moreno assumes that·both Taiwan and 
South Korea are small countries, so that the import and 
export supply are perfectly elastic. Similar assumptions are 
used in Arize and Spalding (1991). Based on this assumption, 
Moreno finds that the long-run relative export (import) 
price elasticities for Taiwan's exports (imports) is -0.79 
(-1.44) and for South Korea's exports (imports) is -0.72 (-
0.74). 
10 Moreno claims that different factors have caused 
relative prices changes in favor of Taiwan and South Korea. 
For Taiwan, he notes the low domestic inflation rate, and 
for South Korea the depreciation of the Won. However, he 
argues that the lower income elasticities of imports in 
Taiwan compared to its trading partners, rather than the 
relative prices effects, is the dominant cause of rising 
trade surpluses for Taiwan in the 1980s. 
model to estimate the price and income elasticities of 
Japanese trade for the period 1970Ql-1985Q4. His results 
show that all the price and income coefficients have the 
expected signs and almost all of these coefficients are 
significant at the 95% level or better. The results also 
show the activity (income) variables tend to have higher 
long-run elasticities and shorter lags (i.e. less than a 
year) and the relative price variables tend to have lower 
long-run elasticities and longer lags. 11 Moreover, based 
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on the estimated elasticities, Noland claims that the 
Japanese trade balance exhibits the familiar J-curve effect. 
As he notes in the paper, a 10% devaluation of Yen will 
immediately worsen the Japanese trade balance by 9% (of the 
value of imports) and will improve the trade balance by 4.6% 
(of the value of imports) in the long-run. Finally, Noland 
uses the model to investigate the possible effects of the 
yen's appreciation through 1987. He claims that, by 1990, 
the yen's appreciation will ultimately reduce the Japanese 
surplus (in yen terms) by 35% from its mid-1987 level, or by 
around 2% of GNP. 
Arize and Spalding (1991) find that not only the long-
run but also the shott-run import demand price elasticities 
are significantly negative in South Korea for 1973-1985. 
11 For example, he finds the average lag of the 
response of import demand to changes in relative prices is 
nine quarters. 
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Thus, they conclude that the real depreciation of the Won 
(which increases Korea's relative import prices) is 
effective in reducing South Korea's import demand. 
Moreover, using the long-run import and export price 
elasticities to examine the Marshall-Lerner condition, they 
show that the restricted form of the Marshall-Lerner 
condition is satisfied in South Korea's case. 
O'Neill and Ross (1991) use both structural and reduced 
form equations to evaluate the major determinants of South 
Korea's exports to the United States, Japan, and the four 
largest EC countries - West Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom, and Italy - for the period 1972-1988. Using a 
structural (reduced-form) model, they find that for Korea's 
exports, all the "direct" relative export price (exchange 
rate) variables have the expected negative sign while the 
"cross" relative export price (exchange rate) effect is 
, t. 12 pos1 1ve. O'Neill and Ross note that the positive 
"cross" relative export price (exchange rate) coefficient 
may be explained by complementarity in export demand and the 
large role of imported inputs in South Korean production. 
12 According to O'Neill and Ross, the direct relative 
export price (exchange rate) is defined as the prices of 
Korean exports relative to prices of the OECD economy's 
competing domestic goods (the ratio of Korean wholesale 
prices to the OECD economy's wholesale prices, adjusted by 
the latter's currency rate against the won). The cross 
relative export price (exchange rate) is defined as the 
prices of Korean exports relative to the prices of other 
suppliers to the OECD economy (the ratio of Korean wholesale 
prices to a geometrically weighted average of the other 
suppliers' export prices). 
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Hill (1990) argues that both the trade balance and the 
real exchange rate are "endogenous" and the relationship 
between the trade balance and the real exchange rate is "bi-
directional". He states that too much emphasis has been 
placed on the causality that runs from the exchange rate to 
the trade balance and not enough on the causality that runs 
the other way. In contrast to previous studies, Hill points 
out that the disturbances with the greatest potential for 
generating a large and persistent U.S. trade deficit are 
"intertemporal shocks", and the direction of causality of 
those "intertemporal shocks" is the one that runs from the 
trade balance to the real exchange rate. He cites three 
intertemporal shocks that have contributed to the U.S. trade 
deficit in the 1980s. First, the growth in the U.S. federal 
budget deficit has worsened the trade deficit. Second, the 
decontrol of capital flows in major foreign countries 
(especially, the Japanese liberalization of controls on 
capital outflows) have kept U.S. interest rates from rising 
to a higher level. Third, the cyclical movements (surges) 
of investment in the U.S. have reduced the U.S. capacity to 
produce consumption goods and encouraged international 
borrowing. Therefore, to reduce the U.S. trade deficit, 
Hill argues, one should "target" those "shocks" (e.g. the 
reductions in the federal budget deficit or a cutoff in 
foreign lending) instead of focusing on the real 
depreciation of the U.S. dollar. As he notes in the paper: 
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A decline in the trade deficit is likely to be accompanied by a 
depreciation of the real dollar. But that depreciation itself will 
explain only part of the ultimate improvement in the deficit. 
Studies that ask "How far must the dollar fall to balance the 
trade account?" are likely to over-estimate seriously the extent 
of needed dollar depreciation. 
In summary, most of the papers we reviewed in this 
section support the view that exchange rate (relative price) 
changes are effective in improving the trade balances either 
in developed or developing countries [Goldstein and Khan 
(1985), Helkie and Hooper (1987), Krugman and Baldwin 
(1987), Bahmain-Oskooee (1985), Hickok and Klitgaard (1988), 
Moreno (1989), Noland (1989), Arize and Spalding (1991), and 
O'Neill and Ross (1991)]. Moreover, some studies claim the 
existence of J-curve effect following the real depreciation 
of the domestic currency [Goldstein and Khan (1985), Helkie 
and Hooper (1987), Krugman and Baldwin (1987), Bahmani-
Oskoose (1985), Noland (1989)]. This conventional view of 
the effectiveness of exchange rate changes (and thus 
exchange rate policy), however, has been challenged by Hill 
(1990) and the Mundell-McKinnon view of the trade deficit. 
Goldstein and Khan (1985) also point out that exchange rate 
policies must work with the "absorption approach" and 
"monetary approach" in order to be successful. Finally, 
Rose and Yellen (1989a and 1989b) and Rose (1991a and 
1991b), using different statistical techniques, have shown 
that exchange rate changes are ineffective and no J-curve 
effect is evident for the OECD countries. 
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Financial Market Integration 
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) argue that if capital is 
perfectly mobile internationally, there should be little or 
no relation between domestic investment in a country and the 
amount of saving generated in that country. Using cross-
section data for sixteen OECD countries for the period 1960-
1974, they find that the correlation between gross domestic 
saving and investment is highly significant and close to 
one. Thus, Feldstein and ·Horioka conclude that the world's 
capital is not mobile. They note that this conclusion, 
however, is consistent with the international mobility of 
short-term liquid capital as well as the existence of 
substantial international flows of long-term portfolio and 
direct investment. As for the former, they note that only a 
small part of the total world capital stock is held in 
liquid form and the high mobility of liquid capital can only 
eliminate short-term interest rate differentials, not saving 
and investment correlation. As for the later, they claim 
that since much direct foreign investment is made to enhance 
trade positions or to take advantage of special knowledge, 
it is not sensitive to differences in saving rates or 
relative capital intensities. Finally, they note that the 
extent of direct and portfolio investment which is made in 
pursuit of higher yields is apparently limited by 
institutional barriers and portfolio preferences. 
Frankel (1985) argues that the high correlation between 
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the domestic saving and investment rates found by Feldstein-
Horioka for cross-section data does not indicate that 
international (financial) capital is immobile. He points 
out three different definitions of perfect capital mobility. 
First, closed (covered) interest parity, which requires 
insignificant barriers such as transactions costs and 
capital controls. Second, uncovered interest parity, which 
requires both closed interest parity and small exchange risk 
premiums. Third, real interest parity, which requires both 
uncovered interest parity and ex-ante relative purchasing 
power parity. Since the first two definitions of perfect 
capital mobility hold between the United States and other 
major industrial countries, Frankel claims that the world's 
"financial" markets are highly integrated. 
In addition, he notes that the failure of real interest 
parity is consistent with the high correlation between 
domestic saving and investment rates, since both saving and 
investment are functions of the real interest rate. 
However, as the failure of real interest parity is due to 
the failure of ex-ante relative purchasing power parity, 
which in turn is because of the imperfect integration of 
international goods (not financial) markets, he claims that 
neither the real interest differential nor the high saving 
and investment correlation indicates that the world's 
"financial" assets are immobile. 
Cumby and Mishkin (1986) find that real (ex-ante) 
21 
interest rates climbed dramatically between the 1970s and 
the 1980s in both the United States and the European 
countries. They also find that there is a significant (but 
not perfect) positive correlation between real interest rate 
movements in the United States and seven European 
industrialized countries. In addition, they note that real 
interest rates within European countries are not more 
closely linked with one another than with the U.S. real 
interest rate. Finally, since the European real interest 
rates do not move one-for-one with the U.S. real interest 
rate, Cumby and Mishkin conclude that it is possible that 
European monetary policy can influence domestic economic 
activity. 
Frankel and MacArthur (1988) claim that the covered 
interest differential is the most appropriate measure of 
international financial capital mobility. By using the 
covered interest differential criterion, they find that the 
financial markets in the United States and a number of other 
countries (Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom, Belgium, Sweden, Japan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore) are highly integrated in the 1980's. They also 
find that almost all real interest differentials among those 
countries are due to the two currency premia (i.e. expected 
real depreciation and exchange risk premium) rather than the 
country premium. Moreover, among the two currency premia, 
they find that the expected real depreciation is the major 
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determinant of real interest differentials. 
Frankel (1989) notes that the continuing worldwide 
trend of financial markets integration in the 1980s has 
eliminated the country premium (i.e. the covered interest 
differentials are smaller). He claims, however, that the 
real and nominal exchange rate variability (which are the 
sources of the currency premium) remain and are even higher 
in the 1980s than in the 1970s. Because the currency 
premium remains, Frankel claims that the large differentials 
in (domestic and foreign) real interest rates persist. 
Finally, by including the latest data available for his 
study (1987), Frankel finds that the traditional Feldstein-
Horioka result of a near-unit correlation between domestic 
saving and investment rates broke down in the United States. 
He notes that this result was attributable to the U.S. 
borrowing excessively from foreign countries in the 1980's 
and the process of liberalization in Japan and other major 
countries stimulated the massive flow of capital to the 
United States. 
Lindner (1992) examines changes in South Korea's 
foreign exchange policy, monetary policy, and capital market 
developments in the second half of the 1980s, a time when 
South Korea experienced a significant current account 
surplus. She notes that the South Korean government had 
taken several liberalization measures (which include 
liberalizing the exchange rate and capital control system, 
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domestic interest rates, and the system of allocating 
domestic credit) to relieve the potential inflation 
consequences of the large balance of payments surplus during 
that time. However, some liberalization policies were 
postponed or reversed when South Korea's external surplus 
.fell dramatically in 1989. Lindner concludes that South 
Korea's liberalizing policies were not a comprehensive plan 
13 to improve the efficiency of the economy. 
Amsden and Euh (1993) point out that although there has 
been some financial liberalization in South Korea in the 
1980s, South Korea's financial system continues to operate 
within the framework of its industrial policy. They further 
note that, instead of relying exclusively on market forces, 
South Korea has achieved its goals of modernizing the 
financial sector by creating new institutions or remodeling 
old ones. One example is that the South Korean government, 
instead of liberalizing interest rates, has chosen an 
alternative method, developing the Korean stock market, to 
achieve the economic goals of relying less on foreign 
capital to finance investments, mobilizing domestic saving, 
and encouraging efficient investment. Through the 
13 Nevertheless, she notes this conclusion is offset 
somewhat as a number of liberalization policies are 
continuing in some areas in the early 1990s in South Korea. 
These policies include the introduction of a new (more 
liberalized) foreign exchange system in 1990 and the 
permission of limited foreign investment through the stock 
market in January 1992. 
development of the stock market, not only is South Korea's 
industrial policy of low cost finance to business 
maintained, but the savers are also provided attractive 
opportunities for their saving. Amsden and Euh presented 
another example which showed South Korean government does 
not rely on market forces to achieve economic goals. That 
is, in order to support small- and medium-size firms, 
instead of granting banks and other financial institutions 
the authority to decide to whom to lend, the Korean 
government has set minimum quotas on the amount of credit 
that financial institutions must allocate to such firms. 
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Kuo (1990) examines the process and results of Taiwan's 
financial liberalization during the 1980s. She notes that 
because of the careful planning as well as the general 
economic background of price stability, budgetary surplus, 
and trade liberalization, Taiwan's financial liberalization 
appears to be on the right track in terms of order, speed, 
and coverage. Kuo's study covers three areas of Taiwan's 
financial market liberalization: (a) interest rate 
liberalization; (b) foreign exchange liberalization; and (c) 
the liberalization of the securities and insurance markets. 
In general, her study showed that most of Taiwan's financial 
liberalization in these three areas were successfully 
implemented in the second half of the 198.0s. 
Cunningham (1991) points out that Taiwan's financial 
liberalization policies [e.g. the 1987 lifting of all 
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restrictions on current account transactions and up to a net 
nontrade-related outflow (inflow) of U.S.$5 million 
($50,000) per year] have diminished the central bank's 
ability to influence the domestic real interest rate. This 
development, he notes, is to be expected in a small open 
economy, as real interest rate movements in the rest of the 
world force similar movements domestically. Cunningham also 
notes that-the liberalization has two desirable long-term 
effects on Taiwan's economy. First, the liberalization 
slows the mercantilist-like accumulation of foreign assets, 
and eventually will reduce Taiwan's trade surplus and ease 
trade tensions with the country's trading partners. Second, 
the accessibility of the large accumulation of national 
savings to (higher return) international markets relieves 
the domestic political pressure for both international and 
domestic liberalization. 
CHAPTER III 
A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE J-CURVE EFFECT: 
THE SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN CASES 
Since the mid-1980s, the U.S. economy has experienced 
substantial trade deficits. The prolonged recession in the 
early 1990s has raised concern about reducing the U.S. trade 
deficit with the rest of the world. Among the world's major 
trading countries, the trade surpluses (deficits) of Taiwan 
and South Korea with the U.S. (Japan) were significant and 
large during the 1980's and early 1990 1 s. During this 
period, Taiwan and South Korea imported mostly capital goods 
and intermediate products from Japan and exported 
manufactured goods to the United States (see, for example, 
Liang and Liang (1990)]. 
Table 5 shows the composition of trade between Taiwan 
(South Korea) and the United States (Japan) for the period 
1981-1990. In this period, over 95% of Taiwan's and South 
Korea's exports to the United States are either manufactured 
goods or machinery and transport equipment, and over 80% of 
imports from the United States are food, crude materials, 
chemicals, and machinery and transport equipment. During 
the same time, over 85% of Taiwan's and South Korea's 
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TABLE 5 
THE COMPOSITION OF TRADE BETWEEN TAIWAN 
(SOUTH KOREA) AND THE UNITED 
STATES (JAPAN) 
AVERAGE 1981-1990112 
Taiwan Taiwan Taiwan Korea Korea Korea Korea 
Export Import Export Import Export Import Export 
to from to from to from to 
u. s. u. s. Ja12an Ja12an U.S. u. s. Ja12an 
2.1% 11.8% 30.3% 1.9% 1.4% 12.1% 17.3% 
0.0% 1. 6% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 
0.3% 17.3% 6.7% 2.3% 0.2% 23.9% 3.3% 
0.1% 4.7% 1. 6% 0.8% 0.2% 4.8% 7.4% 
0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 
1. 3% 14.9% 3.8% 11.9% 0.9% 11.3% 4.1% 
15.0% 5.6% 13.6% 22.6% 16.7% 6.3% 24.7% 
33.6% 37.2% 15.2% 52.5% 33.8% 34.9% 12.0% 
46.8% 5.4% 27.0% 6.7% 45.6% 4.9% 29.6% 
0.8% 1. 3% 1.8% 1. 2% 0.6% 0.8% 1. 5% 
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Import 
from 
Ja12an 
0.8% 
0.0% 
2.7% 
1.5% 
0.1% 
13.8% 
23.3% 
48.9% 
7.3% 
1.6% 
1. Source: author's own calculation based on data from the 
OECD Statistics Directorate Foreign Trade by Commodities. 
2. According to the Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC), the one-digit sectors are as follows: 
o: Food and live animals; 1: Beverages and tobacco; 2: 
crude materials, inedible, except fuels; 3: Mineral fuels, 
lubricants and related materials; 4: Animal and vegetables 
oils, fats and waxes; 5: Chemicals and related products, 
n.e.s.; 6: Manufactured goods classified chiefly by 
material; 7: Machinery and transport equipment; 8: 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles; 9: Commodities and 
transactions not classified elsewhere in SITC. 
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imports from Japan are manufactured goods and machinery and 
transport equipment, while over 80% of exports to Japan are 
food, manufactured goods, and machinery and transport 
equipment. Therefore we can conclude that the U.S. (Taiwan 
and South Korea) trade deficit with Taiwan and South Korea 
(Japan) in the 1980s was mainly in the sectors of 
manufactured goods and machinery and transport equipment. 
While several policy instruments may be used to reduce 
the deficit, the real depreciation of the U.S. dollar 
against the currencies of its trading partners is believed 
to be highly effective, especially in the long run. 14 
Since the mid-1980s, the U.S. dollar has depreciated 
significantly (both in nominal and real terms) against 
Taiwan's and South Korea's currencies. 15 During the 1985-
1991 period, the U.S. dollar depreciated, in nominal (real) 
terms, by 33% (34%) against the N.T. dollar and by 16% (33%) 
against the Won, despite the depreciation of Won against 
U.S. dollar since 1989. Over this period, the U.S. trade 
deficit with Taiwan has not changed much in nominal terms 
14 Recent U.S. government policy reflects the policy 
makers' belief in the effectiveness of exchange rates in 
affecting the trade balance. one example is the United 
States Treasury Report's accusation of major trade surplus 
countries' manipulation (undervaluation) of their 
currencies. This Report has put pressure on those (surplus) 
countries to appreciate their currencies [see Baum (1992) 
and Park and Park (1991)]. 
15 This discussion of Taiwan's and South Korea's trade 
balance and exchange rate with the United States and Japan 
are based on the data from Table 1-4. 
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(from $3,898 million in 1985 to $3,281 million in 1991) but 
significantly in real terms (from $3,899 million in 1985 to 
$2,836 million in 1991). In the same period, however, the 
U.S. trade deficit with South Korea has been reduced 
significantly in both nominal and real terms (from $1,352 
million to $502 million in nominal terms and from $1,351 
million to $346 million in real terms). Figures 1-4 show 
the nominal and real exchange rate and trade balance (in 
domestic currency) between Taiwan (South Korea) and the 
United States for the period 1973Q2-1991Q4. In both the 
Taiwan-u.s. (Figures 1 and 2) and South Korea-u.s. (Figures 
3 and 4) cases, visual inspection shows a relationship 
between (real and nominal) exchange rate depreciation of the 
U.S. dollar and (real and nominal) U.S. trade balance 
improvement in the late 1980s. This relationship, however, 
is not evident between Taiwan and the United States before 
the mid-1980s and between South Korea and the United States 
before 1982. 
During the last two decades, the Japanese Yen has 
appreciated significantly against N.T.$ and Won in nominal 
terms. In real terms, however, the exchange rate between 
Yen and N.T.$ and Won are relatively stable. In the 1970-
1991 period, Yen has appreciated 78% (531%) in nominal terms 
and has depreciated 14% (appreciated 30%) in real terms 
against N.T.$ (Won). During the same time, Japan's trade 
surplus with Taiwan and South Korea have grown significantly 
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Figure 1. Taiwan-u.s. Nominal (TWER) and Real 
Exchange Rate (TWRER) 
Source: Author's own calculations based 
on data from Financial Statistics, 
Taiwan District, ROC. 
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Figure 2. Taiwan-u.s. Nominal (TUB) and Real Trade 
Balance (RTUB) 
Source: Author's own calculations based 
on data from OECD, Monthly Trade 
Statistics, and Financial Statistics, 
Taiwan, ROC. 
32 
Wonl'U.S.$ 
927 .4853 ,----,/',-\ ------------------------, 
758.7869 
573.9284 
j 5 
i ' 
'\ Jl \ 
\ \ . ...._ KRRER ... J,_/.-
·· .... ~~\ ... \..... ._,._r.,,\J .. 
·\ ......... 
\ ; 
1 .... -
KRER 
/\· •... 
..... _ .. 
397 .1saa __ ............................................................................................................................................... ._._. ................................................................. ....... 
1973Q2 1978Ql 1982Q4 1987Q3 1991Q4 
Figure 3. south Korea-u.s. Nominal (KRER) and 
Real Exchange Rate (KRRER) 
Source: Author's own calculations based 
on data from IMF, International 
Financial Statistics. 
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Figure 4. South Korea-u.s. Nominal (KUB) and 
Real Trade Balance (RKUB) 
Source: Author's own calculations based 
on data from OECD, Monthly Trade 
Statistics, and IMF, International 
Financial Statistics. 
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in nominal terms (from $150 million to $2,924 million with 
Taiwan and from $196 million to $2,575 million with South 
Korea). In real terms, however, Japan's trade surplus has 
grown more significantly with Taiwan than with South Korea 
(from $126 million to $632 million with Taiwan and from $312 
million to $450 million with South Korea). Figures 5-8 show 
the nominal and real exchange rate and trade balance (in 
domestic currency) between Taiwan (South Korea) and Japan 
during the 1973Q2-1991Q4 period. Visual inspection shows a 
relationship between nominal (real) depreciation of Yen and 
the increase of Japan's nominal (real) trade surplus with 
Taiwan in the late 1980's (see Figures 5 and 6). This 
relationship, however, is not evident between Taiwan and 
Japan before the mid-1980's and between South Korea and 
Japan throughout the entire period. 
Rose and Yellen (1989a and 1989b) and Rose (1991a and 
1991b) have shown there is no significant short- or long-run 
relationship between the real exchange rate and the trade 
balance both in bilateral terms (U.S. versus the major OECD 
trading partners) and in aggregate terms (major OECD 
16 
countries versus rest of the world). Therefore, it is of 
16 Rose and Yellen point out two factors which have 
been neglected by conventional trade studies - the unit-root 
of the time series data and the simultaneity problems 
between the trade balance, the exchange rate and domestic 
and foreign output. By applying first-differencing process 
and two stage least squares, they have shown that no J-curve 
effect exists in both the bilateral and the aggregate trade 
of the OECD countries. 
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Exchange Rate (TWRERJ) 
Source: Author's own calculations based 
on data from IMF, International 
Financial Statistics, and Financial 
Statistics, Taiwan, ROC. 
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Figure 6. Taiwan-Japan Nominal (TJB) and Real 
Trade Balance (RTJB) 
Source: Author's own calculations based 
on data from OECD, Monthly Trade 
Statistics, and Financial Statistics, 
Taiwan, ROC. 
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Figure 7. South Korea-Japan Nominal (KRERJ) and 
Real Exchange Rate (KRRERJ) 
Source: Author's own calculations based 
on data from IMF, International 
Financial Statistics. 
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interest to test whether any significant J-curve 
relationship exists in bilateral trade between Taiwan (South 
Korea) and the United States. In order to extend and 
generalize our results, the bilateral (aggregate) trade 
between the two NICs and Japan (rest of the world) will also 
be tested. 
Methodology 
Following Rose and Yellen (1989a and 1989b) and Rose 
(1991a and 1991b), the direct estimation of non-structural 
equations will be used to estimate the effects of real 
exchange rates on the trade balance. 17 
B = B ( q, Y, y") [l] 
Equation [l] is the non-structural equation of interest 
to our study. In this equation, Bis the domestic real 
trade balance, defined as the value of net exports in 
17 According to Rose and Yellen, the use of a single 
non-structural equation to estimate the relationship between 
the real exchange rate and the trade balance is much easier 
than the prevalent structural approach, which requires 
estimation of the structural parameters. They claim another 
advantage of using non-structural equation is to resolve the 
simultaneity problem; choosing valid instruments in the non-
structural equation is less difficult than obtaining correct 
specifications of the structural price and volume equations. 
Finally, Rose and Yellen note that investigators employing 
the detailed structural approach have frequently imposed,-
priors in their estimation and implicitly assumed the · 
validity of the structural equations. This strategy is 
consciously avoided, they said, by imposing extensive tests 
for the sensitivity of the (non-structural) model. The 
working paper version of Rose and Yellen (1989a) provides a 
detailed discussion of these arguments. 
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domestic currency deflated by the domestic price level (P), 
18 * , q is the real exchange rate, and Y (Y) is the level of 
real income measured in domestic (foreign) output. 
Determining the signs of the long- and short-run 
derivative Db/dq is the primary objective of the study. If 
db/dq is positive, it means that the. Bickerdike-Robinson-
Metzler (BRM) condition or the generalized Marshall-Lerner 
d , t , ' t ' f ' d 19 con 1 ion is sa is ie. The estimated empirical 
equations are the log-linear approximations to equation [1] 
augmented by a "suitable" number of lags of the independent 
variables, a constant, and a disturbance term. Finally, 
Rose and Yellen have pointed out that a simultaneity exists 
between the trade balance and the current values of income 
and exchange rate. Therefore, two stage least squares 
(2SLS) will be used to estimate equation [1]. 
Data and Preliminary Analysis 
The bilateral import and export values are taken from 
the OECD Monthly Trade Statistics. The domestic and foreign 
Consumer Price Index (CPI), the Wholesale Price Index (WPI), 
Industrial Production Index (IP) (used as a proxy for real 
18 , * The real exchange rate, q is equal to (E · P) / P, 
where Eis the nominal exchange rate (defined as tpe 
domestic currency price of foreign exchange) and P is the 
foreign price level, and Pis the domestic price level. 
19 In the case of initially balanced trade and infinite 
supply elasticities in both home and foreign countries, BRM 
reduces to the Marshall-Lerner condition. 
output), nominal exchange rate (E), and three instrumental 
variables - money supply (Ml), government consumption, and 
the current account balance - are taken from the IMF 
International Financial Statistics or from the Financial 
Statistics, Taiwan District, ROC. All the variables are 
measured in real terms using the CPI as the price 
20 deflater . The equation is estimated in logarithmic 
form. 21 
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All the data are quarterly and span the first quarter 
of 1971 (1972) through the fourth quarter of 1991 for Taiwan 
(South Korea). The beginning point of the analysis is 
dictated by the availability of a consistent data series for 
the instrumental variables. 22 
Two preliminary tests, unit-roots and co-integration 
20 In calculating Taiwan's and South Korea's real 
exchange rate and real effective exchange rate, the foreign 
Wholesale Price Index (WPI) is used instead of Consumer 
Price Index (CPI), because WPI reflects more appropriately 
the price of "traded" goods. For some countries (France, 
Australia, and Malaysia), the CPI is used instead because 
the WPI is either unavailable or the data are inconsistent. 
21 In Rose and Yellen (1989a and 1989b) and Rose (1991a 
and 1991b), domestic and foreign interest rates are also 
used as instrumental variables. However, due to the capital 
controls during most of the 1970s and 1980s in Taiwan and 
South Korea, this study does not use interest rates as 
instruments. Instead, the domestic and foreign current 
account balances are used as instruments. Lindner (1992), 
argues that the balance of payments is one of the factors 
that affects South Korea's "managed floating" exchange rate. 
22 The data series needed to calculate (lagged) real 
(effective) exchange rate start from the fourth quarter of 
1968 for Taiwan and the fourth quarter of 1969 for South 
Korea. 
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tests, are applied to each variable in equation (l]. Unit-
root tests show whether a time-series variable is 
stationary. If unit-roots are found in time-series 
variables, these variables are not stationary, which means 
some transformation (e.g. first-differencing of the non-
stationary variables) is necessary. 23 Co-integration 
analysis indicates whether there exists a stable linear 
steady-state relationship between a set of variables (e.g. 
the trade balance, the real exchange rate, and domestic and 
foreign output) when all these variables have been found to 
have unit-roots. A set of variables are co-integrated if 
each individual variable is not stationary (i.e. has unit-
root), but some linear combination of all the variables is 
stationary (i.e. does not have unit-root). If variables in 
equation (l] are found to have unit-roots but are co-
integrated, the hypothesis that there is a stationary linear 
relationship linking the trade balance to the (logarithms of 
the) real exchange rate and domestic and foreign output 
should be accepted. 
Unit-Roots Tests 
A time series variable Xis said to have unit-root if 
23 , , • Without the transformation, the regression results 
of these non-stationary variables will be "spurious" and the 
standard errors of the coefficients will be under-estimated. 
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its autoregressive representation has the form: 24 
[2] 
where€ is a stationary random error term, ~~i (i=l, ... ,p) < 
k 1 , and L Xt = Xt-k. 
To test whether variable X has a unit-root, the Dickey-
Fuller (DF) and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests use the 
following regression: 
(i=l, ... ,p) [ 3] 
A significant negative estimate of B-means the null 
hypothesis (i.e. variable X has unit-root) can be rejected. 
However, the test statistics in the "t-like" DF and ADF 
tests are not distributed as the traditional "Student's t" 
under the null hypothesis. The test statistics and the 
critical values for the DF and ADF tests are obtained using 
the statistical software package Microfit 3.0. 
Table 6 reports the ADF tests for unit-roots of 
. 1 d . . 25 variab es B, Y, Y*, an q in equation [l]. Because of 
the quarterly nature of the data, four augmented lags are 
chosen in the ADF tests. 26 The sample period, which covers 
24 This discussion of unit-roots is adopted from Rose 
(1991a and 1991b). 
25 As we need to estimate six "pairs" of trade flows 
(i.e. Taiwan-u.s., Taiwan-Japan, South Korea-u.s., South 
Korea-Japan, Taiwan-Rest of the World, and South Korea-Rest 
of the World) in equation [l], there are seventeen variables 
[B(6), Y(2), Y*(3), and q(6)] to be tested for unit-root. 
26 In the ADF tests, a constant term is included in 
equation [3]. Moreover, in the ADF tests with trend case, a 
time trend is also included in equation [3]. 
TABLE 6 
AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER (ADF) 
UNIT-ROOT TESTS 1 
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Variable Without Trend With Trend 
RTUB 
RTJB 
RKUB 
RKJB 
RTWTB 
RKRTB 
LTWIP 
LUSIP 
LKRIP 
LJPIP 
LWIP 
LTWRER 
LTWRERJ 
LKRRER 
LKRRERJ 
LTWREER 
LKRREER 
-1. 45 
-~70 
-1.80 
-3.09+ 
-1. 29 
-2.10 
-.77 
-.77 
-1. 54 
.51 
-.28 
-.57 
-2.26 
-.76 
-2.91+ 
-.82 
-.92 
1. The ADF(4) 95% Critical Value is -2.90 for the 
trend case and is -3.47 for the with trend case. 
indicates that the null hypothesis (i.e. variable 
root) can be rejected at the 95% level. 
-1. 53 
-2.47 
-1. 86 
-4.07+ 
-2.52 
-2.32 
-2.36 
-3.76+ 
-2.48 
-3.90+ 
-3.80+ 
-1. 52 
-2.91 
-1. 30 
-2.89 
-1.85 
-1.56 
without 
A + 
has unit-
2. RTWB, RTJB, RKUB, RKJB, RTWTB, and RKRTB are the real 
trade balance variables between Taiwan and U.S. and Japan, 
Korea and U.S. and Japan, Taiwan and the rest of the world 
(ROW), and Korea and the ROW, respectively. LTWIP, LUSIP, 
LKRIP, LJPIP, and LWIP are the industrial production 
variables for Taiwan, U.S., Korea, Japan, and the world, 
respectively. LTWRER, LTWRERJ, LKRRER, and LKRRERJ are the 
bilateral real exchange rate between Taiwan and U.S. and 
Japan, and Korea and U.S. and Japan, respectively. LTWREER 
and LKRREER are, respectively, Taiwan and Korea's real 
effective exchange rate. Together, these variables 
represent B, Y, Y*, and q in equation [1] for six pairs of 
countries. 
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the flexible exchange rate period, is from the second 
quarter of 1973 to the fourth quarter of 1991. Seventy five 
observations are included for each variable. 
With a few exceptions, the test statistics in Table 6 
show that most variables in equation [1] have unit-roots (or 
are not stationary) in all six pairs of countries. 27 This 
finding is consistent with the bilateral and aggregate 
results of Rose and Yellen (1989a and 1989b) and Rose (1991a 
and 1991b) for the OECD countries. Therefore, in order to 
have a "non-spurious" result when testing equation [1], it 
is necessary to take the first differences of all the 
variables in Table 6. 
Co-Integration Tests 
Given that the variables in equation [1] are found to 
have a unit-root, we can then examine whether these 
variables are co-integrated. Two methods are used to check 
for co-integration. The first method uses the DF and ADF 
tests for unit-root of the residuals from a regression of 
each of the variables in equation [1] (e.g. the real trade 
balance) on the other three variables (e.g. the log of real 
exchange rate, real domestic and foreign output). If the 
residuals are found to have a unit-root, variables in 
27 The variable plots show that only the five output 
variables have trend. Even though the unit-root hypothesis 
can be rejected for some output variables, twelve out of 
seventeen variables in Table 4 are found to have unit-root. 
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equation [1] are not co-integrated. 28 Table 7 reports the 
unit-root test results for six pairs of countries. Since 
all of the OF and most ADF test statistics are not 
significant (i.e., the null hypothesis that the residuals 
have a unit-root cannot be rejected), we can conclude that 
the variables in equation [1] are not co-integrated in all 
six cases. Therefore, first differencing of the variables 
is appropriate. 
The second method to test for co-integration is to use 
the Johansen maximum-likelihood-ratio test to examine the 
number of co-integrating vectors (r) among the total co-
integrating variables (m). If r = o cannot be rejected, it 
indicates that there is no co-integration relationship among 
the variables in equation [1]. If r = m cannot be rejected, 
it indicates that the hypothesis that the variables in 
equation [1] have a stationary process cannot be rejected. 
Table 8 reports the Johansen maximum-likelihood-ratio test 
results. The number of co-integrating vectors equal to zero 
cannot be rejected at both the 95% and 90% levels in the 
Taiwan-u.s. and Taiwan-ROW (Rest of the World) cases. The 
largest number of co-integrating vectors appear in the 
Taiwan-Japan case and is less than or equal to three. The 
~
8 Since every variables in equation [1] can be used as 
a regressand, ADF unit-root tests are applied to four groups 
of residuals (from four regressions) for each of six pairs 
of trade flows. 
TABLE 7 
CO-INTEGRATION TESTS 1 
(UNIT-ROOT TESTS FOR RESIDUALS) 
Regressand DF/ADF 
B DF 
ADF (1) 
ADF(2) 
ADF(3) 
ADF (4) 
q DF 
ADF (1) 
ADF(2) 
ADF(3) 
ADF(4) 
Y DF 
ADF ( 1) 
ADF(2) 
ADF(3) 
ADF(4) 
Y* DF 
ADF ( 1) 
ADF(2) 
ADF(3) 
ADF(4) 
TW-US TW-JP KR-US KR-JP 
-3.14 -2.85 -3.09 -3.62 
-2.06 -2.82 -2.55 -3.29 
-2.09 -2.12 -1.76 -2.65 
-1. 30 -2.09 -1.08 -2.08 
-2.18 -2.81 -2.21 -3.27 
-2.38 -3.11 -2.39 -2.58 
-2.39 -3.63 -2.18 -2.78 
-2.31 -2.89 -1.67 -2.28 
-1.66 -2.85 -1.34 -2.00 
-2.79 -3.19 -1.87 -2.35 
-2.99 -3.30 -3.03 -3.62 
-2.64 -3.37 -3.72 -3.56 
-3.19 -3.26 -3.49 -3.81 
-2.35 -3.46 -3.39 -4.06 
-3.34 -4.09 -4.42+ -4.41+ 
-3.03 -3.85 -2.74 -3.11 
-4.02 -3.82 -3.81 -3.27 
-3.10 -3.44 -3.58 -3.74 
-2.90 -3.46 -3.74 -4.35+ 
-4.51+ -4.46+ -4.78+ -3.83 
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TW-ROW KR-ROW 
-3.33 -4.20 
-3.16 -3.29 
-1.88 -2.63 
-1.93 -2.13 
-1. 95 -2.77 
-2.64 -2.18 
-3.44 -2.21 
-2.21 -1.87 
-2.19 -1. 75 
-2.79 -1. 89 
-2.94 -3.46 
-3.27 -4.04 
-3.06 -4.47+ 
-2.98 -4.54+ 
-2.91 -4.81+ 
-3.35 -3.03 
-4.04 -3.99 
-3.46 -4.07 
-2.85 -4.24 
-4.88+ -4.06 
1. The 95% critical value is -4.2491 for the DF, -4.2512 for 
the ADF(l), -4.2534 for the ADF(2), -4.2556 for the ADF(3), 
and -4.2579 for the ADF(4). A+ indicates that the 
hypothesis of unit-root residuals can be rejected at the 95% 
level. 
Country 
TW-US 
TW-JP 
KR-US 
KR-JP 
TW-ROW 
KR-ROW 
TABLE 8 
CO-INTEGRATION TESTS 1 
(JOHANSEN MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD RATIO TESTS) 
Null 
r = o 
r :::; 3 
r :::; 2 
r :::; 2 
r = o 
r < 2 
Alternative 
r = 1 
r = 4 
r = 3 
r = 3 
r = 1 
r = 3 
Statistic 
21.75 
.97 
9.59 
11.68 
23.64 
5.18 
95% c.v. 
27.07 
3.76 
14.07 
14.07 
27.07 
14.07 
1. r represent the number of co-integrating vectors. 
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90% c.v. 
24.73 
2.69 
12.07 
12.07 
24.73 
12.07 
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co-integrating vectors in all the Korean cases are less than 
29 
or equal to two. This finding is consistent with what 
Rose (1991a and 1991b) has found for the OECD countries. 
Since the number of co-integrating vectors in every case is 
less than the number of co-integrating variables (which is 
equal to four), we conclude that the Johansen maximum-
likelihood-ratio test results indicate that variables in 
equation [ 1 J do not have a stationary process. Therefore,. 
we are confirmed that it is appropriate to take the first 
differences of all the variables in Table 6. 
Empirical Results 
This section presents results from estimating equation 
[1]. The estimated equation of the cumulative impact of the 
exchange rate and output takes the following form of 
equation [1): 
* * 
.6.Bt = a + ~Bi.6.qt-i + ~rj.6. Yt-j + ~rj .6. y t-j + Et [ 4] 
where .6. stands for the first-differencing operation, i 
~ At only the 95% level, the number of co-integrating 
vectors equal to zero can not be rejected in the Taiwan-
U.S., Taiwan-Japan, and Taiwan-ROW cases. The highest number 
of co-integrating vectors, which is less than or equal to 
two, appears in the Korea-U.S. case. Table 8 reports 
results which assume the variables in equation [1] have a 
trend in Johansen maximum likelihood procedure. Variables 
plots indicate that two variables (i.e., trade balance and 
exchange rate) in equation [1] show no trend. We have re-run 
the tests assuming all the variables (in equation [1]) do 
not have a trend. The no-trend results show the highest 
number of co-integrating vectors at the 95% level is less 
than or equal to three and appears only in the Korea-Japan 
case. 
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represents the current and eight lags of real (first-
differenced) exchange rate, j represents the current and two 
lags of real (first-differenced) domestic and foreign 
output, and Et is a random error term. 
Because of the simultaneity problem between the 
exchange rate and trade balance and the unit-root of the 
variables in equation [l], two stage least squares and 
first-differencing of the variables are employed in the 
tests. Our study will report the test results with current 
and eight (two) lags of the exchange rate (domestic and 
foreign output) as independent variables~ The results with 
different lags for the exchange rate and domestic and 
30 foreign output are similar to the ones we report here. 
The instrumental variables estimation of equation [l] for 
the six pairs of countries are presented in Tables 37-42 of 
30 We have used the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
to choose the maximum number of lags which yields the 
minimum value for the AIC (the AIC is calculated as 
a 2exp ( 2K/N) , where a2 = e' e/N, N is the number of 
observations, K is the number of parameters, and e is the 
vector of OLS estimated residuals). We find that the number 
of exchange rate lags (with two lags of domestic and foreign 
output) which minimizes the AIC is less than or equal to 
eight in all cases. The exchange rate lags for each case is 
as follows: Taiwan-U.S. (6), Taiwan-Japan (4), Korea-U.S. 
(7), Korea-Japan (1), Taiwan-ROW (8), and Korea-ROW (2). 
This finding supports using eight exchange rate lags in 
estimating equation [l]. In the robustness tests section of 
Chapter III, we have re-estimated equation [l] with 
different exchange rate (and output) lags. 
d . A 31 Appen ix . In all six cases, none of the exchange rate 
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coefficients is significant and no J-Curve (i.e. the initial 
negative real exchange rate coefficients turning to positive 
32 in later time periods) appears. 
Table 9 exhibits the cumulative impact of the exchange 
rate and domestic and foreign output on the trade balance of 
Taiwan and South Korea. All of the cumulative coefficients 
(except in the KR-JP case) have the expected signs, but none 
is significant. That is, even though the long-run effects 
of a real depreciation and an increase of foreign (domestic) 
output are beneficial (detrimental) to Taiwan's and south 
Korea's trade balance, the effects are not significant. 
Table 10 reports the Wald test results of the 
hypothesis that the current and lagged exchange rate are 
31 The instruments used includes an intercept term, two 
lags of real (effective) exchange rate, four lags of 
domestic and foreign (world) industrial production, current 
and three lags of foreign government consumption (in the 
Taiwan-ROW and Korea-ROW cases, no government consumption 
instruments are used), current and three lags of domestic 
and foreign money supply (Ml) (in the Taiwan-u.s., Korea-
u.s., Taiwan-ROW, and Korea-ROW cases, only the domestic 
country's Ml is used), and current and three lags of 
domestic and foreign current account balance (in the Taiwan-
ROW and Korea-ROW cases, U.S. and Japan current account 
balances are used as "world" current account balances). All 
the instruments, except the current account balances, are 
the first differences of the logged real value with domestic 
and foreign CPI used as a deflater. Current account balances 
are the first differences of the real value. 
32 Since the instruments are possibly non-linear (see 
Rose and Yellen (1989a)), R2 is meaningless in the 
instrumental variable estimation. For this reason, we do not 
report R2 in the test results. 
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TABLE 9 
TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE OF CUMULATIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE (OUTPUT) COEFFICIENT 
1973Ql-1991Q4 
Country Coefficient Estimate Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
TW-US LBi 190423.3 190902. 6 . .998(.322] 
Lrj -161649.2 123760.3 -1.306(.196] 
~r*j 245268.2 192787.1 .272(.207] 
TW-JP LBi 7774.7 12951.6 .600(.550] 
Lrj -21522.6 10874.9 -1.979(.052] 
Lr*j 5156.0 13951.2 .370(.713] 
KR-US LBi 1180001.0 1575438.0 .749(.456] 
Lrj -1707629.0 1133463.0 -1.507(.136] 
Lr*j 2840744.0 1756884.0 1.617(.110] 
KR-JP LBi -201565.1 766362.4 -.263(.793] 
Lrj 178160.0 807751. 4 .221(.862] 
Lr*j 181469.2 686591. 5 .264(.792] 
TW-ROW LBi 1180.0 824.5 1.431(.157] 
Lrj -307.3 397.3 -.773(.442] 
Lr*j 40.1 586.4 .068(.946] 
KR-ROW LBi 17582.8 15648.7 1.124(.265] 
Lrj -11004.9 9495.6 -1.159(.250] 
Lr*j 11917.5 11833.0 1.007(.317] 
Country 
TW-US 
TW-JP 
KR-US 
KR-JP 
TW-ROW 
KR-ROW 
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TABLE 10 
WALD TESTS OF EXCHANGE RATE COEFFICIENTS 
1973Ql-1991Q41 
Wald Statistics Value 
2.4934 
9.1520 
5.4512 
12.6953 
15.5151 
9.7086 
Probability level 
.981 
.423 
.793 
.177 
.078 
.375 
1. The 95% critical value of CHI-SQ(9) is 16.9190. 
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jointly significant as determinants of the trade balance. 
As the Wald statistics are not significant in all cases, we 
conclude that the null hypothesis [i.e. Bi (i=O, ..• ,8) = 
OJ in equation [4] can not be rejected. In other words, the 
current and lagged (first-differenced) real exchange rates 
are jointly insignificant in determining the trade balances 
in all cases. 
In summary, our results are similar to those of Rose 
and Yellen (1989a and 1989b) and Rose (1991a and 1991b) for 
the major OECD countries. They indicate that there is no J-
Curve in either the bilateral or aggregate trade of two 
Asian NICs, Taiwan and South Korea. Moreover, our results 
show that none of the exchange rate coefficients is 
significant in determining the trade balance. 
Robustness Checks 
The results of previous section are contrary to most 
previous studies. As our study has used a different 
statistical technique (i.e., first-differenced data and two 
stage least squares) in the tests, it is of interest to 
examine whether these different techniques are responsible 
for the results. Several robustness tests, adopted from 
Rose and Yellen (1989a and 1989b), are included. The test 
results are reported in the following sections. 
Use of Different Instruments, Time Periods, 
Lag Numbers, and Estimation Methods 
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Since there are doubts about the suitability of the 
instrumental variables used in estimation of equation [l] 
[see Rose and Yellen (1989a and 1989b)J, we have re-
estimated the equation using different sets of instruments. 
The instruments used include various combinations of 
domestic and foreign money supplies, government consumption, 
current account balance, lagged exchange rate and lagged 
output. However, none of the results shows any significant 
changes from those reported in the previous section. Table 
11 exhibits the cumulative impact of the exchange rates and 
output on the trade balance using a different set of 
. t 1 . bl 33 ins rumenta varia es. As we can see, almost all the 
coefficients in Table 11 have the correct signs but none of 
the cumulative exchange rate. coefficients is significant. 
Moreover, the instrumental variable estimation of current 
and lagged values of the variables (not reported in this 
33 The instruments used in the bilateral trade cases 
(i.e. TW-US, TW-JP, KR-US, and KR-JP) include an intercept 
term, four lags of the exchange rate and domestic and 
foreign industrial production, and current and three lags of 
domestic and foreign money supplies and current account 
balances. The instruments used in the aggregate trade cases 
(i.e. TW-ROW and KR-ROW) include an intercept term, four 
lags of effective exchange rates and domestic and world's 
industrial production, current and three lags of domestic, 
the U.S., and Japan's money supply, current and three lags 
of domestic, the U.S., and Japan's government consumption, 
and current and three lags of domestic current account 
balances. 
Country 
TW-US 
TW-JP 
KR-US 
KR-JP 
TW-ROW 
KR-ROW 
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TABLE 11 
TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE OF CUMULATIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE (OUTPUT) COEFFICIENTS 
WITH A NEW SET OF INSTRUMENTS 
1973Ql-1991Q41 
Coefficient 
LBi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
LBi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
LBi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
LBi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
LBi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
LBi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
Estimate 
56559.4 
-75989.4 
149738.6 
5039.4 
-19358.0 
6239.3 
1425417.0 
-1718018.0 
3084469.0 
-141014.2 
71004.7 
315067.5 
673.2 
-169.5 
74.2 
10878.4 
-10267.7 
5701.1 
Standard Error 
106052.5 
53519.8 
92151. 4 
17227.4 
11700.0 
15163.5 
1445273.0 
1010598.0 
1538870.0 
794680.8 
729447.8 
735601.0 
408.2 
198.1 
278.9 
11039.3 
6388.3 
8911. 3 
T-Ratio[Prob] 
.910(.366] 
-1. 420 [ .160] 
1. 625 [ .109] 
.293(.771] 
-1. 655 [. 102 J 
.411(.682] 
.986(.327] 
-1.700(.093] 
2.004(.049]+ 
-.177(.860] 
.097(.923] 
.428(.670] 
1. 649 [. 104 J 
-.856(.395] 
.266(.791] 
.985(.328] 
-1. 607 [. 112 J 
.640(.524] 
1. A+ indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 
95% level. 
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study) also give no indication of significant exchange rate 
coefficients or existence of a J-curve. 
The second robustness test involves re-estimating 
equation (1] for different time periods. We have re-
estimated equation (1] with the data going back to the first 
quarter of 1971 for Taiwan and the first quarter of 1972 for 
South Korea, as these are the earliest time that the lagged 
instrumental variables data are available in both economies. 
Furthermore, the nominal exchange rate in Taiwan (South 
Korea) was fixed prior to February 1979 (1980), after which 
a managed floating regime was instituted in both economies. 
We have estimated equation (l] using the first quarter of 
1981 as the starting point for both countries. The test 
results, based on these different time periods, again, do 
not show any significant changes from those we reported 
previously. Tables 12 and 13 report the cumulative impact 
of the exchange rate and output on the trade balance for the 
1971Q4-1991Q4 (1972Q4-1991Q4 for South Korea) and 1981Ql-
1991Q4 periods respectively. Similar to our previous 
findings, we observe that almost all the coefficients in 
both tables have the correct signs, but only two of them are 
significant (both for the 1981Ql-1991Q4 period). The only 
case where real depreciation improves the trade balance 
significantly in the long run is trade between Taiwan and 
the rest of the world (TW-ROW) .However, from the results for 
individual current and lagged coefficients (not reported 
Country 
TW-US 
TW-JP 
KR-US 
KR-JP 
TW-ROW 
KR-ROW 
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TABLE 12 
TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE OF CUMULATIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE {OUTPUT} COEFFICIENTS 
1971Q4-1991Q41 
Coefficient 
I:Bi 
I:rj 
I:r*j 
I:Bi 
I:rj 
I:r*j 
I:Bi 
I:rj 
I:r*j 
I:Bi 
I:rj 
I:r*j 
!:Bi 
I:rj 
I:r*j 
!:Bi 
I:rj 
I:r*i 
Estimate 
183369.9 
-161682.5 
253477.6 
17369.0 
-24861.5 
10089.2 
443290.9 
-2461089.0 
3557554.0 
-28218.4 
128771. 9 
357054.5. 
1198.6 
-407.5 
154.6 
15064.5 
-11158.2 
9265.9 
Standard Error 
191353.9 
118322.4 
193223.0 
17979.7 
12577.1 
14885.4 
1930493.0 
1275647.0 
2307799.0 
732918.6 
826579.7 
639525.7 
961.7 
463.6 
696.1 
15493.3 
9441.7 
11125.5 
T-Ratio[ProbJ 
.958[.341] 
-1.367(.176] 
1. 312 [. 193] 
.966[.337] 
-1.977[.052] 
.678(.500] 
.230(.819] 
-1.929(.058] 
1.542[.127] 
-.039(.969] 
.156(.877] 
.558(.578] 
1.246(.216] 
-.879[.382] 
.222(.825] 
.972(.334] 
-1.182 [. 241] 
.833(.408] 
1. For the KR-US, KR-JP, and KR-ROW cases, the time period 
is 1972Q4-1991Q4. 
Country 
TW-US 
TW-JP 
KR-US 
KR-JP 
TW-ROW 
KR-ROW 
59 
TABLE 13 
TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE OF CUMULATIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE (OUTPUT} COEFFICIENTS 
1981Q4-1991Q4 1 
Coefficient 
:EJ3i 
:Erj 
:Er*j 
:EJ3i 
:Erj 
:Er*j 
:EJ3i 
:Erj 
:Er*j 
:EJ3i 
:Erj 
:Er*j 
:EJ3i 
:Erj 
:Er*j 
:EJ3i 
:Erj 
:Er*j 
Estimate 
103734.9 
-57611. 5 
143288.8 
10239.4 
-33482.1 
9703.2 
2633843.0 
-740942.0 
869729.5 
1872113.0 
-2544899.0 
1338495.0 
1315.2 
33.6 
37.3 
11853.0 
-19511.5 
29195.3 
Standard Error 
82686.4 
62532.9 
109358.6 
19260.0 
12737.0 
26898.9 
1437862.0 
2151767.0 
2325489.0 
991796.2 
1814200.0 
1631956.0 
609.0 
268.6 
595.7 
17775.0 
20789.3 
28400.0 
T-Ratio[Prob] 
1.255(.217] 
-.921(.362] 
1.310(.197] 
.532(.598] 
-2.629(.012]+ 
.361(.720] 
1.832(.047] 
-.344(.732] 
.374(.710] 
1.888(.066] 
-1.403(.168] 
.820(.417] 
2.160(.037]+ 
.125(.901] 
.063(.950] 
.667(.509] 
-.939(.353] 
1. 028 [. 310) 
1. A+ indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 
95% level. 
in this study), there reveal absence of a J-curve in all 
cases. 
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It is possible that the number of lags in the real 
exchange rate and domestic and foreign output can affect the 
test results. Therefore, equation [l] is re-estimated with 
four and twelve lags of real (first-differenced) exchange 
rates and four lags of real (first-differenced) domestic and 
foreign output. Tables 14-16 report the cumulative impact 
of the exchange rate and output for the different lags. A 
few more coefficients have the wrong sign, but are 
insignificant, in all cases. In none of the cases does the 
exchange rate have a significant long-run effect on the 
trade balance. Individual coefficient estimates (not 
reported in this study) show several lagged exchange rate 
coefficients are "randomly" significant in some cases. 
However, none of the signs of the exchange rate coefficients 
changes from negative to positive as the lags increase. 
That is, we can not find the existence of J-curve in any of 
the cases. 
Finally, following the conventional approach, equation 
[l] is re-estimated using ordinary least squares {OLS). 
Table 17 reports the cumulative impact of the exchange rate 
and output on the tra-de balance. Most coefficients have the 
correct signs, but only three of them are significant. The 
long-run impact of exchange rate is significant only in the 
KR-US (Korea-U.S.) case. Individual-coefficients estimates 
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TABLE 14 
TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE OF CUMULATIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE (OUTPUT) COEFFICIENTS 
WITH FOUR LAGS OF EXCHANGE RATE 
1973Q4-1991Q4 1 
Country Coefficient 
TW-US LBi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
TW-JP LBi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
KR-US LBi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
KR-JP LBi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
TW-ROW LBi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
KR-ROW LBi 
Lrj 
Lr*i 
Estimate 
135140.0 
-103083.7 
232991.2 
3557.6 
-24620.1 
8661.0 
942807.2 
-74975.6 
1943612.0 
-296160.l 
-80795.2 
268162.7 
16.0 
10.7 
367.4 
445.7 
1478.3 
4661. 6 
Standard Error 
102433.9 
55993.1 
84686.0 
8854.6 
8830.6 
11110.6 
1344136.0 
1145866.0 
1507092.0 
496063.4 
636084.4 
629067.7 
399.8 
225.1 
353.0 
12572.8 
7779.9 
10442.6 
T-Ratio[Prob] 
1. 319 [ .191] 
-1.841(.070] 
2.751(.008]+ 
.402(.689] 
-2.788(.007]+ 
.780(.438] 
.701(.485] 
-.065(.948] 
1. 290 [. 201] 
-.597(.552] 
-.127(.899] 
.426(.671] 
.040(.968] 
.048(.962] 
1.041[.302] 
.035[.972] 
.190(.850] 
.446[.657] 
1. A+ indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 
95% level. 
Country 
TW-US 
TW-JP 
KR-US 
KR-JP 
TW-ROW 
KR-ROW 
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TABLE 15 
TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE OF CUMULATIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE (OUTPUT) COEFFICIENTS 
WITH TWELVE LAGS OF EXCHANGE RATE 
1973Ql-1991Q4 
Coefficient 
LBi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
LBi 
Lrj 
~r*j 
LBi 
Lrj 
~r*j 
LBi 
~rj 
Lr*j 
~Bi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
LBi 
Lrj 
~r*j 
Estimate 
264138.0 
-56772.8 
103443.9 
13063.4 
-13747.4 
5985.9 
994267.4 
-3462740.0 
2347819.0 
352256.5 
46267.6 
301001.5 
-238.4 
-321.0 
-403.0 
4 791. 7 
-27494.2 
1046.9 
Standard Error 
155506.0 
79968.3 
124405.0 
23999.3 
13711. 2 
18483.1 
2094936.0 
2197562.0 
2363907.0 
1023083.0 
885987.7 
854328.9 
1338.0 
507.1 
760.5 
28443.7 
23887.0 
23865.2 
T-Ratio(Prob] 
1. 699 [. 094] 
-.710[.480] 
.832[.408] 
-.544(.588] 
-1.003[.319] 
.324[.747] 
.475[.637] 
-1. 576 [ .120] 
.993[.324] 
.344[.732] 
.052[.959] 
.352[.726] 
-.178[.859] 
-.633[.529] 
-.530(.598] 
.168[.867] 
-1.151[.254] 
.044(.965] 
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TABLE 16 
TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE OF CUMULATIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE (OUTPUT) COEFFICIENT 
WITH FOUR LAGS OF OUTPUT 
1973Ql-19~1Q4 
Country Coefficient Estimate Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
TW-US :EBi 152558.6 163413.6 .934(.354] 
:Erj -112615.2 177120.6 -.636(.527] 
:Er*j 186320.6 240322.5 .775(.441] 
TW-JP :EBi -9623.0· 23709.3 -.406(.686] 
:Erj 12293.4 25290.7 .486(.628] 
:Er*j -26845.0 30058.9 -.893(.375] 
KR-US :EBi 2349332.0 1477228.0 1.590(.116] 
:Erj -2243170.0 2401182.0 -.934(.353] 
:Er*j 4591166.0 2974425.0 1.544(.127] 
KR-JP :EBi 218569.6 13.02399. 0 .168(.867] 
:Erj -471815.6 1604622.0 -.294(.770] 
:Er*j 788425.7 1877820.0 .420(.676] 
TW-ROW :EBi 580.3 1344.6 .432(.667] 
:Erj 299.8 1085.8 .276(.783] 
:Er*j -1368.6 1749.8 -.782(.437] 
KR-ROW :EBi 655.4 25316.2 .026(.979] 
:Erj 1962.5 30590.8 .064(.949] 
:Er*j 15355.2 36535.6 .420(.676] 
Country 
TW-US 
TW-JP 
KR-US 
KR-JP 
TW-ROW 
KR-ROW 
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TABLE 17 
TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE OF CUMULATIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE (OUTPUT) COEFFICIENTS 
USING OLS WITH FIRST-
DIFFERENCED DATA 
1973Ql-1991Q4 1 
Coefficient 
LBi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
LBi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
LBi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
LBi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
LBi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
LBi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
Estimate 
74905.9 
-6411. 9 
36581.2 
-606.0 
-24105.7 
8723.1 
1350510.0 
-1039450.0 
1820834.0 
409066.5 
-398854.5 
619501.0 
503.1 
32.5 
24.1 
5349.9 
-4709.1 
1525.4 
Standard Error 
44136.8 
25050.7 
42223.8 
11219.1 
7129.4 
9616.3 
619790.5 
580370.9 
700911. 5 
321016.2 
375797.2 
399749.3 
338.2 
177.8 
325.7 
6088.0 
4447.0 
6259.5 
T-Ratio[Prob] 
1.697(.094] 
-.256(.779] 
.866(.389] 
-.054(.957] 
-3.381(.001]+ 
.907(.367] 
2.179(.033]+ 
-1. 791[. 077] 
2.598(.011]+ 
1.274(.207] 
-1.061(.292] 
1.550(.126] 
1.488(.145] 
.183(.856] 
.074(.941] 
.879(.382] 
-1. 059 [. 293] 
.244(.808] 
1. A+ indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 
95% level. 
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(not reported in this study) show some lagged exchange rates 
are randomly significant in several cases. But again, none 
of the exchange rate coefficients exhibits a J-curve effect. 
Use of Real Imports and Exports as Regressands 
and the Use of Partial Adjustment Equations 
Because this study uses the net trade balance as the 
dependent variable, the effects of the real exchange rate on 
import and export values separately (e.g., the perverse 
effect of real depreciation on import value as described by 
the J-curve effect) may be disguised. For this reason, we 
have re-estimated the equations with real exports and 
, d . 34 imports as separate regressan s. Tables 18 and 19 report 
the cumulative effect of exchange rate and domestic and 
foreign output on exports and imports respectively. Table 
18 shows that real depreciation (and increase of foreign 
output) has the expected (positive) effect on the domestic 
34 There is another advantage to using imports and 
exports separately as regressands. Since both Taiwan and 
South Korea are small countries, most of their exports are 
denominated in foreign currencies (especially in U.S.$) [see 
Krugman and Baldwin (1987)]. If Taiwan's and South Korea's 
exports are denominated in U.S.$, the real depreciation of 
N.T.$ and Won against U.S.$ shall increase their export 
value (in domestic currencies) in the short run. This is 
different from what the J-curve effect predicts, because it 
is based on the assumption that exports are denominated in 
domestic currency. Testing imports and exports separately 
should tell us whether Taiwan's and South Korea's export 
value increases in the short run following a real 
depreciation. If this is the case, we may conclude that 
(part of) the reason that we fail to find a J-curve effect 
is because both Taiwan and South Korea are small countries. 
TABLE 18 
TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE OF CUMULATIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE (OUTPUT) COEFFICIENTS 
BY USING EXPORT AS REGRESSAND 
1973Ql-1991Q4 
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Country Coefficient Estimate Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
TW-US L.Bi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
TW-JP L.Bi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
KR-US L.Bi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
KR-JP LBi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
TW-ROW L.Bi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
KR-ROW L.Bi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
101106.3 
-47920.6 
124555.9 
26721. 2 
10473.4 
4433.2 
1051187.0 
-725425.4 
1954336.0 
211525.4 
779521.5 
182477.9 
826.6 
-35.7 
240.7 
18431.4 
-3138.8 
12393.0 
92929.6 
60245.3 
93846.9 
15754.2 
· 1104 7. 9 
14173.2 
1574704.0 
1132936.0 
1756066.0 
759072.9 
800068.1 
680060.6 
559.2 
269.5 
397.7 
21389.7 
12979.2 
16174.1 
1.088(.280] 
-.795(.429] 
1.327(.189] 
1.696(.094] 
.948(.346] 
.313(.755] 
.668(.507] 
-.640(.524] 
1.113(.269] 
.279(.781] 
.974(.338] 
.268(.789] 
1.478(.144] 
-.132(.895] 
.605(.547] 
.862(.392] 
-.242(.810] 
.766(.446] 
TABLE 19 
TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE OF CUMULATIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE (OUTPUT) COEFFICIENTS 
BY USING IMPORT AS REGRESSAND 
1973Ql-1991Q4 1 
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Country Coefficient Estimate Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
TW-US :EBi 
:Erj 
:Er*j 
TW-JP :EBi 
:Erj 
:Er*j 
KR-US :EBi 
:Erj 
:Er*j 
KR-JP :EBi 
:Erj 
:Er*j 
TW-ROW :EBi 
:Erj 
:Er*j 
KR-ROW :EBi 
:Erj 
:Er*j 
-89317.0 
113728.6 
-120712.3 
23602.0 
31995.9 
-722.9 
-128814.8 
982203.6 
-886408.3 
413090.6 
601361.4 
1008.7 
-353.4 
271. 6 
200.6 
848.6 
7866.1 
475.5 
120318.9 
78001.6 
121506.7 
17286.7 
12122.6 
15551. 9 
818893.2 
589161.0 
913207.2 
857090.0 
903378.5 
767874.6 
596.6 
287.5 
424.3 
16864.3 
10233.2 
12752.2 
-.742(.460] 
1.458(.149] 
-.993(.324] 
1.365(.176] 
2.639(.010]+ 
-.046(.963] 
-.157(.875] 
1. 667 [ .100] 
-.971(.335] 
.482(.631] 
.666(.508] 
.001(.999] 
-.592(.556] 
.945(.348] 
.473(.638] 
.050(.960] 
.769(.445] 
.037[.9701 
1. A+ indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 
95% level. 
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country's exports in the long run in all cases, but none of 
the effects is significant. Table 19 shows that an increase 
in domestic output has the expected (positive) effect on 
imports in the long run in all cases, but the effect is 
significant only in the TW-JP (Taiwan-Japan) case. The 
long-run effects of changes in the real exchange rate on 
imports are disappointing. It shows that in only three 
cases (TW-US, KR-US, and TW-ROW) does a real depreciation 
has negative effect on imports in the long run, and in none 
of these cases is the effect significant. 
Table 20 reports the cumulative effect of the exchange 
rate and foreign output on exports and Table 21 reports the 
cumulative effect of the exchange rate and domestic output 
. t t. 1 35 on impor s respec ive y. Except the output coefficient 
in Taiwan-Japan case, Table 20 shows all of the exchange 
rate and foreign output coefficients have the expected sign, 
but only one is significant (i.e., the exchange rate 
coefficient in Taiwan-Japan case). Except the exchange rate 
coefficient in Taiwan-Japan case, Table 21 also shows all 
the exchange rate and domestic output coefficients have the 
expected sign, but again, only one is significant (i.e. the 
output coefficient in Taiwan-Japan case). 
Finally, from the individual coefficient results for 
35 Dropping the domestic (foreign) output in the export 
(import) case is because domestic (foreign) output does not 
have a significant impact on domestic country's exports 
( imports) . 
TABLE 20 
TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE OF CUMULATIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE AND FOREIGN OUTPUT 
COEFFICIENTS BY USING EXPORTS 
AS REGRESSAND 
1973Ql-1991Q41 
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Country Coefficient Estimate Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
TW-US I:Bi 68612.9 104223.2 .658(.512] 
I:r*j 31858.5 63911.8 .498(.620] 
TW-JP I:Bi 56517.1 23764.5 2.378(.020]+ 
I:r*j -1538.5 17198.6 -.089(.929] 
KR-US I:Bi 2068698.0 1985209.0 1.042(.301] 
I:r*j 1735346.0 1846647.0 .940(.350] 
KR-JP I:Bi 643481.3 522984.3 1.230(.222] 
I:r*j 500737.4 514945.6 .972(.334] 
TW-ROW I:Bi 843.6 815.9 1.034(.305] 
I:r*j 100.8 418.6 .241(.810] 
KR-ROW I:Bi 16920.9 31654.2 .535(.595] 
I:r*i 11045.2 21046.4 .525(.6011 
1. A+ indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 
95% level. 
TABLE 21 
TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE OF CUMULATIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE AND DOMESTIC OUTPUT 
COEFFICIENTS BY USING IMPORTS 
AS REGRESSAND 
1973Ql-1991Q41 
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Count;ry Coefficient Estimate Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
TW-US I:Bi -80842.7 87661. 2 -.922(.359] 
I:rj 48537.5 35103.7 1.383(.171] 
TW-JP I:Bi 11286.5 19975.3 .565(.574] 
I:rj 42213.1 13141.1 3.212(.002]+ 
KR-US I:Bi -258835.0 979407.0 -.264(.792] 
I:rj 784073.5 603102.9 1.300(.198] 
KR-JP I:Bi -1253036.0 1720075.0 -.728(.469] 
I:rj 1886713.0 1581101. 0 1.193(.237] 
TW-ROW I:Bi -119.1 529.5 -.225(.823] 
I:rj 242.5 173.2 1.400(.166] 
KR-ROW I:Bi -2450.4 17928.4 -.137(.892] 
I:rj 8017.2 9314.2 .861(.392] 
1. A+ indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 
95% level. 
71 
both exports and imports (not reported in this study), we do 
not find, as predicted by the J-curve effect, any 
significant import value increase (decrease) in the short 
run (long run) or export value increase in the long run. 
These results further support our findings of no J-curve 
ff t , , t, 36 e ec in previous sec ion. In order to check the 
sensitivity of results to the alternative dynamic 
specification of the trade balance equation, Rose and Yellen 
have re-estimated their model with four lags of the 
Dependent variable. They claim this partial adjustment 
equation is appropriate if the trade balance is 
characterized by a partial adjustment mechanism (i.e., the 
trade balance adjust only slowly to the exchange rate and 
output changes). Following their approach, we have also re-
estimated equation [l] with four lags of the dependent 
variable. Table 22 shows the cumulative impact of the 
exchange rate and output on the trade balance. We find that 
the real exchange rate has a significant long-run effect on 
the trade balance in only one case (Korea-U.S.). Moreover, 
from the individual coefficient results (not reported in 
this study), we cannot find the existence of J-curve in any 
of the cases. 
36 We also find that neither Taiwan's nor South Korea's 
export value (in domestic currencies) has increased 
significantly in the short run after real depreciation. This 
may imply that the failure to find a J-curve in our study is 
not because of both Taiwan and South Korea are small 
countries (See Footnote 34 for a discussion of this issue). 
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TABLE 22 
TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE OF CUMULATIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE (OUTPUT) COEFFICIENTS 
THE PARTIAL ADJUSTMENT MODEL 
1973Ql-1991Q41 
Country Coefficient 
TW-US I:Bi 
:Erj 
:Er*j 
TW-JP I:Bi 
:Erj 
:Er*j 
KR-US I:Bi 
:Erj 
:Er*j 
KR-JP I:Bi 
:Erj 
:Er*j 
TW-ROW I:Bi 
:Erj 
:Er*j 
KR-ROW I:Bi 
:Erj 
:Er*i 
Estimate 
89604.0 
-177277.0 
270332.5 
14220.2 
-9651. 5 
-3150.6 
3514030.0 
-742190.6 
1549085.0 
-264663.7 
350328.3 
61189.7 
1812.5 
-64.7 
-612.3 
12618.3 
-11561.7 
10145.4 
Standard Error 
519007.7 
220811. 6 
316982.9 
21924.0 
16061.8 
18829.4 
1699699.0 
869115.8 
1364259.0 
936615.1 
1203987.0 
1142173.0 
1322.0 
598.6 
906.5 
20183.0 
11466.6 
14985.8 
T-Ratio[Prob] 
.173(.863] 
-.803(.425] 
.853(.397] 
.649(.519] 
-.601(.550] 
-.167(.868] 
2.067(.042]+ 
-.854(.396] 
1.136(.260] 
-.283(.778] 
.291(.772] 
.054(.957] 
1.371[.175] 
-.108[.914] 
-.675(.502] 
.625(.534] 
-1.008(.317] 
.677(.501] 
1. A+ indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 
95% level. 
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Using the Levels Instead of the Differences 
Given that most previous studies used (logs of) levels 
rather than differences, we have re-estimated equation [l] 
with level data. 37 Both OLS and TSLS are applied to tests 
of equation [l]. Tables 23 and 24 report the OLS and 2SLS 
cumulative effect of exchange rate and output on the trade 
balance respectively. Despite some wrong signs, they show 
the long-run effects of the exchange rate have the 
appropriate sign and are significant in four (three for 
2SLS) out of six cases. This finding shows that using the 
levels (instead of the differences) can alter the results 
regarding the long-run effects of exchange rate movements. 
However, when we examine individual exchange rate 
coefficients, shown in Tables 25 and 26, with the exception 
of one coefficient in the OLS Korea-Japan case, the exchange 
rate coefficients are insignificant in both the OLS and the 
2SLS cases. Moreover, the J-curve phenomenon is not 
observable in either case. 
The Traditional Test for the J-curve: 
The Polynomial (Almon) Distributed 
Lag (PDL) Model 
Some previous studies (as example see Bahmani-Oskooee 
37 Examples of previous studies that use levels instead 
of differences include: Krugman and Baldwin (1987), Helkie 
and Hooper (1987), Noland (1989), and O'Neill and Ross 
(1991). 
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TABLE 23 
TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE OF CUMULATIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE (OUTPUT) COEFFICIENTS 
USING OLS WITH NON-DIFFERENCED DATA 
Country Coefficient 
TW-US !:Bi 
I:rj 
I:r*j 
TW-JP !:Bi 
I:rj 
I:r*j 
KR-US !:Bi 
I:rj 
I:r*j 
KR-JP !:Bi 
I:rj 
I:r*j 
TW-ROW !:Bi 
I:rj 
I:r*j 
KR-ROW !:Bi 
I:rj 
I:r*i 
1973Ql-1991Q41 
Estimate 
63056.9 
31755.5 
22229. 9 · 
-13810.9 
3392.8 
-22506.0 
1436957.0 
-12092.1 
1337684.0 
80803.7 
-248786.0 
439170.5 
148.8 
84.8 
126.5 
8120.9 
-236.9 
4789.2 
Standard Error 
9769.9 
7180.8 
23820.9 
9103.5 
181i.3 
4166.9 
94038.4 
41818.4 
181825.7 
93780.9 
41053.8 
119060.3 
58.5 
32.2 
109.0 
1034.5 
406.0 
1611.6 
T-Ratio[Prob] 
6.454[.000]+ 
4.422[.000]+ 
.933(.354] 
-1.517(.134] 
1.873(.065] 
-5.401[.000]+ 
15.281[.000]+ 
-.289(.773] 
.357(.000]+ 
.862(.392] 
-6.060[.000]+ 
.689(.000]+ 
2.541(.013]+ 
.635[.010]+ 
1. 161 [. 250] 
7.850(.000]+ 
-.584(.561] 
2.972(.0041+ 
1. A+ indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 
95% level. 
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TABLE 24 
TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE OF CUMULATIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE (OUTPUT} COEFFICIENTS 
USING 2SLS WITH NON-
DIFFERENCED DATA 
1973Ql-1991Q4 1 
Country Coefficient 
TW-US LBi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
TW-JP LBi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
KR-US LBi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
KR-JP LBi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
TW-ROW LBi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
KR-ROW LBi 
Lrj 
Lr*j 
Estimate 
79849.6 
24034.7 
65946.6 
-37427.3 
6543.3 
-28712.6 
1435921. 0 
-3296.8 
1361064.0 
186243.3 
-231501. 5 
349619.5 
234.7 
53.5 
285.6 
8645.7 
-588.6 
6455.8 
Standard Error 
15637.5 
10508.4 
38891. 4 
23733.5 
2619.9 
6091. 7 
125350.0 
71808.2 
300417.2 
118036.4 
56343.3 
162278.4 
140.0 
66.6 
259.7 
1253.8 
673.2 
2538.8 
T-Ratio[Prob] 
.106(.000]+ 
2.287(.025]+ 
1.696(.094] 
-1. 577 [ .119] 
2.498(.015]+ 
-4.713(.000]+ 
11.455(.000]+ 
-.046[.964] 
4.531(.000]+ 
1.578(.119] 
-4.109(.000]+ 
2.154[.035]+ 
1.677(.098] 
.804(.424] 
1.100(.275] 
6.895(.000]+ 
-.874(.385] 
2.543[.013]+ 
1. A+ indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 
95% level. 
Variable 
q 
q(-1) 
q(-2) 
q(-3) 
q(-4) 
q(-5) 
q(-6) 
q(-7) 
g(-8) 
TABLE 25 
T-RATIOS OF CURRENT AND LAGGED REAL 
EXCHANGE RATES BASED ON OLS AND 
NON-DIFFERENCED DATA1 
1973Q2-1991Q4 
TW-US 
-.17 
.44 
-.15 
.04 
-.76 
1. 01 
.24 
.14 
.23 
TW-JP 
-.35 
.74 
-.83 
-1. 07 
-.12 
.93 
-.21 
.49 
-1. 80 
KR-US 
.31 
-.72 
.35 
1.06 
-.06 
.19 
.82 
1. 34 
.25 
KR-JP 
-2.44+ 
.10 
-.13 
.67 
.30 
-.50 
.10 
1. 65 
-.22 
TW-ROW 
-.61 
.05 
1. 02 
-.60 
-.60 
.65 
.35 
.24 
-.41 
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KR-ROW 
.74 
-1.10 
.86 
.05 
.12 
.44 
.20 
.75 
.95 
1. A+ indicates that the coefficient of the variable is 
significant at the 95% level. 
Variable 
q 
q(-1) 
q(-2) 
q(-3) 
q(-4) 
q(-5) 
q(-6) 
q(-7) 
g(-8) 
TABLE 26 
T-RATIOS OF CURRENT AND LAGGED REAL 
EXCHANGE RATES BASED ON 2SLS AND 
NON-DIFFERENCED DATA 
1973Q2-1991Q4 
TW-US 
.13 
-.02 
-.07 
.16 
-.17 
.49 
-.30 
.25 
-.03 
TW-JP 
-.13 
-.oo 
.19 
-1.17 
-.69 
1.97 
-1. 06 
.85 
-1. 55 
KR-US 
.57 
-1. 71 
1.22 
.74 
-.30 
.39 
.05 
.67 
-.45 
KR-JP 
.06 
-.74 
.14 
1.11 
-.56 
-.38 
.17 
.90 
-.24 
TW-ROW 
-.76 
.43 
.30 
-.62 
.56 
-.40 
.40 
.29 
-.87 
KR-ROW 
1.04 
-1.32 
.84 
.26 
-.19 
-.04 
.19 
.39 
.33 
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(1985) and Noland (1989)) have imposed smoothness priors on 
the exchange rate (relative price) lag coefficients. One 
way of doing this is by constraining the lag coefficients to 
lie on a polynomial (Almon) distributed lag (POL) • 38 An 
Almon distributed lag model [Almon(m,r)] has the following 
form: 
[5] 
where i = 0,1, ... ,m is the number of lags and the weights 
(wd are determined by polynomials of order r: 
[6] 
Because the multicollinearity between lags of the 
difference of the (log of the) real exchange rates is not 
39 
significant, Rose and Yellen are reluctant to use PDLs. 
However, given the tendency of many previous researchers 
(e.g., Helkie and Hooper (1987) and Krugman and Baldwin 
(1987)) to use PDL techniques, Rose and Yellen have 
incorporated PDLs in the OLS estimation of non-differenced 
data as one of their robustness checks. Our study also 
38 An Almon distributed lag model is recommended if the 
number of lags of the independent variable is large and/or 
the collinearities between the lags are significant. See 
Almon (1965) for a discussion of the distributed lag model. 
_ 
39 Goldstein and Khan (1985) have pointed out two 
problems associated with using PDLs in trade models. The 
first problem is the "subjective prefiltering" by the 
researchers in choosing the number of lags, the degree of 
polynomials, and whether the end-point constraints should be 
imposed. The second problem is when using higher-order 
polynomials and a large number of lags, the coefficients for 
some of the lagged variables often have signs that are 
clearly at variance with theoretical expectations. 
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applies PDLs to the OLS estimation of non-differenced data. 
By imposing PDLs to the non-differenced lagged exchange 
rates, we observe (a similar) J~curve phenomenon in all 
cases. 40 Table 27 reports the test statistics and t-ratios 
of the current and lagged exchange rates of an Almon(8,3) 
(Almon distribution with eight lags and third degree 
polynomial) imposed OLS estimation of non-differenced 
41 data. It shows that the negative effect of real 
depreciation lasts from one to five quarters. The positive 
effect emerges after that and diminishes after the seventh 
42 quarters in all cases. In addition to the expected 
signs, many coefficients are significant as well. When we 
impose the Almon(8,3) restriction on the first differenced 
data, however, we find the similar J-Curve phenomenon only 
appear in the Korea-u.s. and Korea-Japan cases (as shown in 
Table 28). In order to test for the existence of a J-curve 
(in the case of non-differenced data) is due to the 
40 Rose and Yellen (1989) also found the existence of 
short J-curves when the PDL smoothness priors (with endpoint 
constraints) are imposed in the aggregate trade cases. 
41 th • t • h h h h As e AIC cr1 er1on ass own tat t e number of 
exchange rate lags are less than or equal to eight in all 
cases (See Footnote 30), we choose eight lags (without 
endpoint constraints) in our PDL models. 
42 One way of choosing the degree of polynomials is to 
choose the one with the lowest AIC given the number of lags 
is fixed. In this study, if we change the degrees of 
polynomial to two, the AIC is lower in the Korea-U.S., 
Korea-Japan, Taiwan-ROW, and Korea-ROW cases but is higher 
in the Taiwan-u.s. and Taiwan-Japan cases. The t-ratios 
based on the degree of polynomials with the lowest AIC are 
similar to the ones we report in Table 27. 
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TABLE 27 
TEST STATISTICS OF CURRENT AND LAGGED 
REAL EXCHANGE RATES BY IMPOSING ALMON 
(8,3) TO THE NON-DIFFERENCED 
REAL EXCHANGE RATES 
1973Q2-1991Q41 
Variable TW-US TW-JP KR-US KR-JP TW-ROW KR-ROW 
q 17719 3881 -60178 -272670 34.02 -184.71 
(1.31) ( 1. 38) (-.40) (-3.47)+ ( . 5 6') (-. 16) 
q(-1) -3924 -3123 -953 -82855 -.90 25.69 
(-.72) (-2.87)+ (-.02) (-2.47)+ (-.04) (. 06) 
q(-2) -10009 -5090 68510 20260 -9.74 272.43 
(-1.19) (-3.08)+ (. 71) (.43) (-.27) (. 38) 
q(-3) -5477 -3741 140200 60536 -. 91 548.27 
(-.78) (-2.82)+ (1.66) ( 1. 58) (-.03) (. 89) 
q(-4) 4728 -801 206100 61836 17.16 845.97 
(. 91) (-.89) (3.33)+ (2.29)+ (.78) ( 1. 85) 
q(-5) 15667 2007 258200 48025 36.05 1158.30 
(2.11)+ (1.40) (3.22)+ ( 1. 18) ( 1. 16) (1.90) 
q(-6) 22396 2961 288490 42966 47.32 1478.00 
(2.62)+ (1.73) (3.11)+ (. 90) (1.30} (2.10)+ 
q(-7) 19973 337 288950 70521 42.56 1797.80 
(3.81)+ (.32) (5.04)+ (2.43)+ ( 1. 72) (4.04)+ 
q(-8) 3456 7588 251570 154550 13.33 2110.50 
(.24) (-2.56)+ ( 1. 69) ( 1. 94) ( . 21) (1.78) 
1. T-Ratios are in the parenthesis. A+ indicates that the 
coefficient of the variable is significant at the 95% level. 
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TABLE 28 
TEST STATISTICS OF CURRENT AND LAGGED 
REAL EXCHANGE RATES BY IMPOSING ALMON 
(8,3) TO THE DIFFERENCED 
REAL EXCHANGE RATES 
1973Q2-1991Q4 1 
Variable TW-US TW-JP KR-US KR-JP TW-ROW KR-ROW 
q 20618 243.2 -427540 -125240 74.88 -2344.1 
(1.49) (. 08) (-1.43) (-1.22) ( 1. 12) (-1.02) 
q(-1) 2763 -487.3 -182560 -41203 38.38 -1221. 3 
(.38) (-.30) (-1.19) (-.72) (. 99) (-1.00) 
q(-2) -1558 -392.5 8405 13648 30.93 -399.1 
(-.19) (-.23) (. 06) (. 21) (. 72) (-.32) 
q(-3) 2928 189.1 152740 47065 41.18 212.0 
(.37) (.12) ( 1. 08) (.77) (. 9 6) (.18) 
q(-4) 11493 919.2 257830 66802 57.78 701. 3 
( 1. 58) ( . 64) (2.05)+ (1.24) {1.39) (. 66) 
q(-5) 19412 1459.4 331070 80611 69.38 1158.3 
(2.43)+ (. 91) (2.40)+ ( 1. 42) ( 1. 57) ( 1. 00) 
q(-6) 21956 1471. 4 379850 96245 64.62 1672.4 
(2.57)+ (.87) (2.51)+ ( 1. 64) ( 1. 42) (1.33) 
q(-7) 14400 616.9 411540 121460 32.17 2333.0 
(1.80) (.43) (2.77)+ (2.37)+ (. 76) ( 1. 89) 
q(-8) -7985 -1442.5 433550 164000 -39.33 3229.5 
(-.58) (-.52) ( 1. 69) (1. 65) (-.59) (1.57) 
1. T-Ratios are in the parenthesis. A + indicates that the 
coefficient of the variable is significant at the 95% level. 
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restriction imposed by POLs on the exchange rate, we have 
conducted an F-test; the null hypothesis is that the POL 
restrictions are not responsible for the J-curve effect. 
Table 29 report the F-statistics for our test. Since the F-
statistics are not significant, we conclude that the POLs 
restrictions are not responsible for our results. 43 
Conclusion 
After a thorough study of Taiwan's and South Korea's 
trade balances with the United States, Japan, and the rest 
of the world, we do not find any J-Curve effects. In fact, 
we do not find that real exchange rate changes have a 
significant impact on the t~ade balance in any of cases. 
The Wald tests show that the hypothesis that the current and 
lagged (first-differenced) real exchange rates are jointly 
equal to zero cannot be rejected at the 95% level. The 
cumulative effects of the real exchange rate and domestic 
and foreign output have the (correct) a priori sign. That 
43 This finding of a J-curve effect, though confirming 
traditional wisdom, is inappropriate given the problems 
mentioned previously. The existence of unit-roots and the 
simultaneity problems must be resolved in order to make 
valid statistical inferences. Since our applying of POLs to 
the OLS estimation of non-differenced data does not solve 
either of these problems, the legitimacy of the results from 
Table 27 is thus questionable. Therefore, the findings of 
J-curve effects by previous researchers may be questioned 
since it is possible that they have used inappropriate 
statistical techniques. 
Country 
TW-US 
TW-JP 
KR-US 
KR-JP 
TW-ROW 
KR-ROW 
TABLE 29 
F - STATISTICS OF THE POL RESTRICTIONS 1 
F - Statistics 
.35 
.55 
.37 
.58 
.96 
.23 
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1. The 1% and 5% critical values for F5 , 59 are (approximately) 
3.34 and 2.37 respectively. The degree of freedom (5,59) are 
the number of restrictions (which equal to the number of 
lags minus the number of polynomials) and the number of 
observations minus the number of parameters, respectively. 
is, a real depreciation and an increase (decrease} of 
foreign (domestic} output will improve the domestic trade 
balance in the long run. However, the effects are not 
84 
significant. 
to the study. 
A number of robustness tests have been applied 
Except when incorporating POLs to the OLS 
non-differenced estimation, none of the results reveals the 
existence of a J-curve. Simply applying POLs to the OLS 
non-differenced estimation, however, may give us "spurious" 
results, as it ignores the unit-root and simultaneity 
problems. Our finding, which corr0borates those of Rose and 
Yellen (1989a and 1989b} and Rose (1991a and 1991b} for OECO 
countries, contradicts the traditional view on the J-Curve 
effect and the effectiveness of exchange rate policies. 
Finally, the J-Curve effect predicts that after a real 
depreciation, the import price will increase while import 
volume, export price, and export volume will stay constant 
in the short run and import (export) volume will decrease 
(increase} in the long run. Therefore, it is of interest to 
examine which of these "sources" of the J-Curve effect are 
violated. This direction of a future study, as noted by 
Rose and Yellen, may explain our results. 
CHAPTER IV 
FINANCIAL MARKET INTEGRATION: 
THE SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN CASES 
Since the early 1980s, Taiwan and South Korea have 
initiated a number of financial liberalization policies. 
These policies cover the areas of financial institutions and 
instruments, exchange rates, interest rates, international 
capital flows, and others. In order to prevent a 
macroeconomic instability from liberalization, many of the 
financial liberalization policies were implemented gradually 
in Taiwan and South Korea. Moreover, because some 
liberalization measures, such as interest rate 
liberalization and the relaxation of capital controls, 
should be implemented only when the financial markets have 
developed in maturity and flexibility, the liberalization in 
those areas is incomplete, especially in South Korea. 44 
Interest rate liberalization and the relaxation of 
capital controls, however, are important in order to 
44 Previous studies have shown that price stability and 
a balanced fiscal budget are important preconditions for 
financial liberalization. Moreover, it is suggested that a 
country's domestic financial market should be liberalized 
before capital flows, and that the trade account should also 
be liberalized before the capital account. For a discussion 
of these arguments, see Kuo (1990). 
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increase the integration of domestic financial market into 
the world financial market. When domestic interest rates 
and capital flows are fully liberalized, international 
capital flows should equalize domestic and forward discount 
adjusted foreign interest rate. Covered interest parity 
implies that the domestic financial markets are perfectly 
integrated with the world's financial markets (Frankel 1985, 
Frankel and MacArthur 1988, and Frankel 1989). Figures 9 
and 10 show Taiwan's interbank rate and the depreciation 
adjusted U.S. Federal Funds rate and Japan's money market 
rate during the period 1981M3-1991Ml2. 45 Figure 9 shows 
that Taiwan's interbank rate and U.S. Federal Funds rate 
appear to be correlated before 1989. This correlation, 
however, appears to vanish after early 1989. Figure 10 
shows that no apparent correlation between Taiwan's 
interbank rate and Japan's money market rate during the 
period can be detected. Figures 11 and 12 display South 
Korea's money market rate and the depreciation adjusted U.S. 
Federal Funds rate and Japan's money market rate during the 
period 1986Ml2-1992M4. Visual inspection shows no 
relationship between South Korea's money market rate and 
U.S. Federal Funds rate in Figure 11. 
45 d f , f d' , Instea o using the orward iscount rate, this 
study uses the realized depreciation rate to adjust foreign 
interest rates. See the Financial Market Integration 
section of this Chapter for a more detailed discussion. 
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Figure 9. Taiwan Interbank Rate (TWIBR) and 
Depreciation Adjusted U.S. Federal 
Fund Rate (USFFRl) 
Source: Author's own calculations based 
on data from Monthly Financial 
Statistics, Taiwan, ROC, and IMF, 
International Financial Statistics. 
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Source: Author's own calculations based 
on data from Monthly Financial 
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International Financial Statistics. 
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Figure 11. South Korea Money Market Rate (KRMMR) 
and Depreciation Adjusted U.S. Federal 
Fund Rate (USFFR2) 
Source: Author's own calculations based 
on data from IMF, International 
Financial Statistics. 
(X) 
19.7000 
14.1362 
8.5724 
90 
KRMttR 
JPMMR2 
/ ____ .,/" ...... ---..... ·,-•.. 
,, ·-----~-
---. .-· .. ....-.. _ ... ,/' 
086 ... ··-······ .... '•,,,,,,.····· .. ·· 3.0· L....... ......... '~'..-.::;:.· .~·····~·····~·---·_ ... _ ... _ ... ex:;~_...... .......................... ~~.,,....... ................................. ~~~~---......... ~~~~ 
1986M12 1988M4 1989MB 1990M12 1992M4 
Figure 12. South Korea Money Market Rate (KRMMR) 
and Depreciation Adjusted Japan Money 
Market Rate (JPMMR2) 
Source: Author's own calculations based 
on data from IMF, International 
Financial Statistics. 
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Before we study the interest rates linkage and 
financial markets integration in the next section, we will 
first discuss the financial liberalization policies in South 
Korea and Taiwan during the 1980s and early 1990s. A more 
detailed description of policy changes in the financial 
· 46 
sector in these two countries appears in Appendix c. 
Financial Liberalization in South Korea 
and Taiwan (1980s and early 1990s) 
To clarify the discussion, this section will present 
South Korea's and Taiwan's financial liberalization in four 
areas: financial institutions (instruments), interest rates, 
foreign exchange rates, and international capital flows. 
Liberalization of Financial 
Institutions and Instruments 
South Korea. In order to increase the efficiency of 
the banking industry, the South Korean government began to 
privatize nationwide commercial banks in 1981; by 1983, the 
government had privatized all nationwide city banks. In 
1982, the South Korean government revised the General 
Banking Act and abolished various regulations on the 
46 The sources for South Korea's financial sector 
policies are: (a) various issues of Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions Annual Report, IMF; and (b) Kim 
(1988). The sources for Taiwan's financial sector policies 
are: (a) Moreno and Yin (1992); (b) Kuo (1990); (c) Chang 
(1990); and (d) various issues of Central Daily News (in 
Chinese). 
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operation and management of banks. 47 Moreover, to increase 
competition in the commercial banking sector, entry barriers 
to the banking sector were also lowered. During 1981-1983, 
two additional nationwide city banks were allowed to be 
established, which brought the total number of nationwide 
city banks in South Korea to seven. Entry barriers have 
been relaxed further in the late 1980s. Since 1988, three 
new commercial banks, whose main purpose is to serve small 
and medium-sized enterprises, have been established (Kim 
1992). The removal of entry barriers was more significant 
in the nonbank financial sector. During 1980-1982, the 
number of investment and finance companies increased from 20 
to 32, and the number of savings and finance companies from 
191 to 249 (Cho and Khatkhate 1989). In 1989, five 
regionally-based securities investment trust companies were 
set up and, in 1987-1990, eighteen life insurance companies 
were established. 48 
To encourage foreign capital inflow and to improve the 
47 As examples, in 1982, the Bank of Korea abolished 
credit ceilings on individual banks and reduced its loans to 
particular (preferential) sectors. 
48 Lindner (1992) notes that the nonbank financial 
institutions (NBFI) have developed a large market share 
during the 1980's in South Korea. As she points out, at the 
end of 1989, 64 percent of deposits were held in nonbank 
financial institutions, compared with 30 percent in 1980. 
Moreover, the share of financing for the business sector by 
nonbank financial institutions was 28 percent in the second 
half of the 1980s, compared with 20 percent for banks. In 
the second half of the 1970s, the share of financing by 
nonbank financial institutions was only 15 percent and the 
share by banks was 26 percent. 
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quality of domestic banks' services and operations, entry 
barriers for foreign banks were also relaxed. In 1987, 
fifty-five branches of foreign banks were operating in South 
Korea. This number increased to sixty-nine at the end of 
49 December 1990. In 1985, the total assets of the foreign 
bank operations accounted for 10.6 percent of total deposits 
50 
of Korean depository banks (Euh and Baker 1990). Along 
with the rapid expansion of foreign branches in South Korea, 
in order to keep up with the rapid growth of cross-border 
transactions, domestic banks' overseas banking networks have 
also expanded rapidly since late 1970s. At the end of 
December 1990, domestic banks had a total number of 143 
overseas establishments, which included: 48 overseas 
branches, 33 subsidiaries and 52 representative offices (Kim 
1992). 51 
Along with the expansion of financial institutions, a 
49 These foreign bank branches, together with twenty-
four representative offices, come from seventeen countries. 
The entry barriers were also relaxed for foreign nonbank 
financial institutions. For example, during the 1987-1990 
period, four foreign life insurance companies were allowed 
to open branches in Seoul (Kim 1992). 
50 Euh and Baker also note that such assets held by 
foreign bank branches were only 4.3 percent of deposits in 
Japan, 6.7 percent of deposits in Taiwan, and 2.1 percent in 
West Germany during the same year. 
51 According to Kim (1992), by establishing merchant 
banks in addition to branches which engage mostly in 
commercial banking, the overseas banking networks are 
extending the scope of their international activities in 
loan syndication, the underwriting of bonds, securities 
investment, and so forth. 
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number of new financial instruments (e.g. commercial paper, 
certificate of deposits, repurchase agreement and Cash 
Management Account - a Korean version of the money market 
fund) were also introduced in South Korea in the 1980s. 
These new financial instruments were designed to stimulate 
the development of short-term and long-term financial 
markets and to enhance the ability of the financial 
institutions to mobilize savings. Moreover, to promote 
competition, some of these new instruments were shared by 
different financial institutions (Kim 1988 and Cho and 
Khatkhate 1989). 
Taiwan. In contrast to the liberalization of South 
Korea's banking industry that privatized most banks in the 
early 1980s, most commercial banks in Taiwan were 
government-owned in the 1980s. 52 The ban on the 
establishment of new banks was not lifted until 1991, when 
fifteen private-owned new banks were allowed to be 
established in Taiwan. Moreover, competition from foreign 
banks is not as significant in Taiwan as in South Korea. As 
Euh and Baker (1990) note, domestic commercial banks in 
Taiwan have provided more than 70 percent of all loan funds 
through the organized financial system. This is notably 
greater than in South Korea where foreign bank branches have 
52 Euh and Baker (1990) note, (in the late 1980s) there 
were sixteen commercial banks which can perform a full line 
of banking business in Taiwan. Twelve of them are government 
owned. 
made a significant amount of loans so that domestic banks 
have been drastically affected by the added competition. 
Although Taiwan is lagging behind South Korea in 
liberalizing the banking industry, a number of 
liberalization measures have increased the competitiveness 
and efficiency of Taiwan's financial institutions. 
In December 1983, in order to enhance local banks' 
competitiveness with foreign banks (especially the banks 
from Singapore and Hong Kong), the Taiwanese government 
authorized banks operating in Taiwan to establish Offshore 
Banking Units (OBUs). As Euh and Baker (1990) note, the 
total volume of assets of OBUs has grown significantly in 
the second half of the 1980s. The number of foreign bank 
branches in Taiwan also increased significantly in the 
1980s. In October 1986, there were 36 local branches of 
foreign banks in Taiwan, or 23 more than 10 years before. 
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At the same time, foreign banks were allowed to set up 
second branch in Taiwan (Chang 1990). Moreover, in June 
1987, foreign banks were permitted to join the local 
interbank remittance system and the interbank ATM sharing 
system (Moreno and Yin 1992). In November 1988, after 
recognizing the urgent need for domestic financial 
institutions to penetrate the world market, the Ministry of 
Finance lifted restrictions limiting the total number of 
domestic bank branches that can be established in a given 
foreign city. In June 1991, the Ministry of Finance allowed 
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15 private-owned banks to be established in Taiwan. The 
liberalization of the establishment of private-owned banks, 
which is part of the newly amended Banking Law in Taiwan, 
lifted the ban, in place for several decades, on 
establishing new institutions in the banking industry. 
Over the last decade, there have also been a number of 
liberalization measures in the nonbank financial 
institutions in Taiwan. Among them, the liberalization of 
the securities and insurance markets are especially 
significant. The revision of the Securities and Exchange 
Law in January 1988 lifted restrictions on the establishment 
of new securities companies in Taiwan. Securities firm 
licenses are now made available to any firm that meets a 
basic set of financial and operating requirements. In 
addition, in order to facilitate the involvement of foreign 
expertise and to improve the quality of local securities 
firms, under the revised law, foreign nationals may 
participate in the securities business through investment in 
and management of local securities firms (Kuo 1990) . 53 The 
insurance companies in Taiwan have not had a significant 
influence on financing local business but do have provided 
53 Some restrictions are still applied on the foreign 
investment in the securities firms. According to Kuo (1990), 
total investment by each individual foreign national is 
limited to 10 percent of the amount of total issued shares 
of any securities firm. No more than 40 percent of the 
shares of any securities firm may be held by foreign 
nationals. No restrictions, however, are applied on foreign 
investment in local securities investment consulting 
companies. 
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some medium- and long-term funds to business firms (Euh and 
Baker 1990). As part of the government policy to liberalize 
the financial market in Taiwan, restrictions on the 
establishment of foreign insurance branches were lifted in 
the late 1980s. According to Kuo (1990), the two major 
liberalizations in Taiwan's insurance market were: (a) since 
1986, a minimum of two U.S. life insurance firms and two 
U.S. non-life insurance firms per year have been allowed to 
enter into the Taiwan market; (b) in February 1989, the 
"Regulations Governing Securities Investment by Overseas 
Chinese and Foreign Investors and Procedures for Remittance" 
were revised to allow branches of foreign insurance 
companies to invest a maximum of 35 percent of their capital 
and reserve in local securities companies. 
Exchange Rate liberalization 
South Korea. The first major exchange rate 
liberalization in South Korea was initiated in early 1980. 
In February 1980, South Korea's fixed exchange rate against 
the U.S. dollar was replaced by a managed floating rate. 
Under the new system, the Bank of Korea set the mid-rate for 
the Won against the dollar based on the SDR basket and an 
unspecified trade-weighted basket of major foreign 
currencies as well as some unspecified factors, w~ich may 
include domestic and foreign price trends and the balance of 
, , , d ) 54 payments position (Lin ner 1992 • All other exchange 
rates were set at small margins from the official mid-
55 
rate. 
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The forward exchange markets were also liberalized in 
South Korea in the early 1980s. Since July 1980, forward 
transactions between the Won and foreign currencies have 
been authorized by the Korean government. Approved forward 
transactions include those related to export and import as 
well as some capital transactions (e.g. the payments on 
long-term foreign currency loans). 
South Korea's exchange rate system was further 
liberalized in the early 1990s. In March 1990, the Korean 
government introduced a new foreign exchange system which 
sets the official mid-rate (between Won and U.S. dollar) as 
a weighted average of the previous day's spot interbank 
transaction rates. Exchange rates are permitted to float 
daily within limited margins, which differ by size and 
denomination of transactions but are generally less than one 
percent. As the exchange rate is now more flexible and is 
moving slowly in line with market pressure, it is believed 
54 According to Lindner, under this system, the U.S. 
dollar remained the intervention currency in South Korea. 
The official rates between the Won and other currencies were 
determined by the cross-rate of the Won-dollar mid-rate and 
dollar-nondollar rates in international markets. 
55 For example, the buying (selling) rates for the 
dollar used for official intervention in the interbank 
market were set by subtracting (adding) a small margin from 
the mid-rate. In 1989, this margin was 0.4 percent. 
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that this new exchange rate system will help relieve the 
external pressures on the money supply from the trade, 
surplus, which South Korea faced in the second half of 1980s 
(Lindner 1992). 
Taiwan. Except for the forward exchange market which 
is not liberalized in Taiwan, the exchange rate system in 
Taiwan, like that in South Korea, has been through two major 
changes. In fact, Taiwan's two major exchange rate 
liberalization measures happened just before South Korea's 
two major exchange rate liberalizations. 
Taiwan's foreign exchange rate system was converted 
from a fixed rate system to a managed floating system in 
February 1979. Following that, the spot central rate 
between the U.S. dollar and N.T. dollar was set daily by 
five major authorized banks on the basis of the weighted 
average of interbank transaction rates on the previous 
business day. The buying and selling rates for the U.S. 
dollar between the bank and the customer are set within 
limits of NT$0.05 above or below the central rate for 
transactions up to US$30,000. For larger transactions, the 
limit is NT$0.10 (Moreno and Yin 1992). 
In 1989, Taiwan's foreign exchange rate system was 
further liberalized. In April 1989, a new system for the 
foreign exchange rate, based on bid-ask quotations, was 
established in Taiwan. The new system applies to interbank 
and retail trading above US$10,000. The previous limits on 
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daily fluctuations of the interbank rate were also removed 
at the same time (Moreno and Yin 1992). 
Interest Rate Liberalization 
South Korea. The objectives of interest rate 
liberalization in developing countries are to promote saving 
and efficient investment and to deepen financial markets 
(Tseng and Corker 1991). However, when the countries 
undergoing financial reforms have shallow financial markets, 
a sudden deregulation of the interest rate may create 
disruptive and destabilizing consequences (Kim 1988 and Cho 
56 
and Khatkhate 1989). Instead of full deregulation of the 
interest rate, South Korea relaxed controls by allowing more 
frequent adjustments in the interest rates, wider bands for 
regulated rates, and the removal of some interest rate 
ceilings (Tseng and Corker 1991). Some of the major 
interest rate liberalization policies in South Korea are now 
presented. 
After 1981, the bank loan and deposit rates in South 
Korea, which were consistently negative in real terms 
56 Cho and Khatkhate ( 1989) note that "In the imperfect 
and oligopolistic money and credit markets characteristic of 
developing countries, a sudden dose of liberalization (of 
interest rate) often leads to the overshooting of both 
nominal and real interest rate." Since real interest rates 
often exceed the marginal return to capital (as happened in 
the Latin American countries, the Philippines and Indonesia 
after their interest rate liberalization), they argue that 
the complete deregulation of the interest rate is not 
desirable when the country is facing high and fluctuating 
inflation rates. 
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throughout the 1974-1980 period, turned increasingly 
positive. The positive real interest rates came from a 
decline in the inflation rate as well as the government 
commitment of maintaining a positive real interest rate by 
adjusting the bank loan and deposit rates based on the 
movement of the inflation rate (Cho and Khatkhate 1989). In 
1982, the interest rate differential between general loans 
and preferential policy loans were eliminated, which was a 
major step toward the gradual removal of policy loans in 
South Korea. In January 1984, a narrow band of 0.5 percent 
(i.e. from 10 to 10.5 percent) in bank loans was introduced 
in order to permit banks to charge different rates based on 
a borrower's creditworthiness. 57 In November 1984, the 
interest rates on long-term deposits were raised by one 
percentage point in order to narrow the gap between 
institutional and market interest rates. At the same time, 
the ceiling on interbank call rates was lifted and the rates 
on issuance of corporate bonds (except for those guaranteed 
by banks) were also liberalized (Kim 1988). In December 
1988, the liberalization of loan rates, longer-term deposit 
rates, and money market rates was announced. This major 
interest rate liberalization policy was expected to improve 
the distribution of money supply changes (and to reduce the 
distributional impact of the sterilization measures) due to 
57 In November 1984, this band was further widened to 
1.5 percent (i.e. from 10 percent to 11.5 percent). 
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the significant current account surplus in the second half 
of 1980s. However, as South Korea's current account surplus 
fell dramatically in early 1989, the implementation of this 
interest rate liberalization plan was delayed and eventually 
canceled (Lindner 1992) . 58 Nevertheless, the interbank 
call rates and the issuing rates of non-guaranteed corporate 
bonds were completely liberalized in 1990 (Kim 1992). 
Taiwan. Like in South Korea, interest rate 
liberalization in Taiwan has also been implemented 
gradually. Currently, however, interest rates are more 
liberalized in Taiwan than in South Korea. 59 According to 
Kuo (1990) and Chang (1990), interest rate liberalization in 
Taiwan can be divided into two stages; the first stage began 
in 1980 and the second started around 1985. 60 We present 
58 Similar argument are found in Kim (1992) and Amsden 
and Euh (1993). Kim notes, ''··· looking back on three years 
of experience under the system of the deregulation of 
interest rates, it would be difficult to say that interest 
rates have functioned as adequately as was expected in view 
of financial liberalization.n He also notes that the 
lending, deposit, and money market rates are still 
controlled, either directly or indirectly, by the monetary 
authorities in South Korea. 
59 For example, controls on deposit and lending rates 
do not exist in Taiwan. In South Korea, however, such 
restrictions still exist. 
6° Kuo argues that the first stage of liberalization. 
was a response to the new circumstances that followed the 
oil crisis and the accompanying international financial 
disorder while the second stage was prompted by massive 
foreign exchange reserves and high money supply growth, 
caused by a huge trade surplus. She notes, however, the 
basic purpose for both stages of liberalization was the 
same, that is, to place a greater reliance on the price 
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briefly these two stages of interest rate liberalization in 
what follows. 
Based on the Banking Law of the early 1980s, the 
maximum deposit rates are prescribed by the Central Bank and 
the maximum and minimum loan rates are proposed by the 
Bankers' Association and submitted to the Central Bank for 
confirmation and enforcement. The first stage interest rate 
liberalization started when Central Bank announced the 
"Essentials of Interest Rate Adjustment" in November 1980, 
which permitted a greater range for the difference between 
maximum and minimum loan rates. In the meantime, the banks 
were allowed to set their own interest rates on negotiable 
certificates of deposit, debentures, and bill discounts. 
Moreover, interest rates on money market instruments (i.e. 
commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, and Treasury bills) 
were fully liberalized and the permissible range of the 
interbank call rate was gradually expanded in the first 
stage of liberalization. 61 
The second stage of interest rate liberalization 
started in November 1984 when the range for the maximum and 
minimum loan rates was widened again by the Central Bank. 
mechanism for adjustment of imbalances. In our study, we 
include the latest interest rate liberalization measure 
(i.e., remove all controls on both deposit and lending 
interest based on the newly revised Banking Law) in the 
second stage. 
61 The expansion of the range of the interbank call 
rate implies that the rate reflects the excess reserves in 
the banking system (Kuo 1990). 
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Other liberalization measures in the second stage included 
the following: 
1. In March 1985, banks were allowed to set the prime rate 
as its own minimum loan rate based on market 
conditions. 
2. In August 1985, banks were allowed to set own rates on 
f . d . t 62 oreign currency epos1 s. 
3. In September 1985, the "Regulations for· Interest Rate 
Management", which prohibited the maximum deposit rate 
from exceeding the minimum loan rate and thus created 
an obstacle to the widening of the range of loan rates, 
were abolished. 
4. In November 1985, the "central interbank call rate 
system" was abolished, which gave each bank complete 
freedom in determining its own call rate. 
5. In July 1989, according to the newly revised Banking 
Law, all the remaining regulations controlling maximum 
deposit rates and. maximum and minimum loan rates were 
eliminated. 
Relaxation of Capital Controls 
South Korea. Like interest rates, capital flows are 
not fully liberalized in South Korea. As Tseng and Corker 
~ As Chang (1990) notes, this change has helped the 
foreign currency deposit rates in line with those on 
international financial markets and encouraged foreign 
exchange earners to hold foreign currency deposits. 
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(1991) note, although some liberalization measures have been 
implemented, most controls on capital flows remained in 
South Korea during the early 1990s. The relaxation of 
capital controls in South Korea in the 1980s and early 1990s 
are mainly in the areas of foreign direct investment, 
overseas investment by residents, and some portfolio 
investment, particularly, the investments in the securities 
markets. As these investments are all long term in nature, 
short-term arbitrage type financial flows are still 
restricted in South Korea. Policies concerning capital 
flows in South Korea in the 1980s and early 1990s are 
described in the following. 
Cho and Khatkhate (1989) note, in the early 1980s, 
because of the public's low confidence in the government's 
ability to manage the economy, the volatile political 
situation, and the widespread distrust of the domestic 
banking system due to scandals and financial vulnerability, 
capital controls, especially on the outflow of capital, were 
believed to be necessary to have prevented capital flight. 
During 1980-1985, all outward remittances of capital from 
South Korea required approval. The inflows of capital, 
however, were encouraged and some capital inflow 
restrictions were relaxed. Some major capital flow 
liberalization measures during this period iricludes: 
1. In July 1984, a revised Foreign Capital Inducement Act, 
which expanded the areas for foreign investment in 
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South Korea, came into effect. 
2. In March 1985, the value limit on investment trusts 
through which foreign residents could indirectly invest 
in Korean bonds and equity was raised by US$30 million 
(increases of the same amount were made twice in April 
1985, raising the limit to US$200 million). 
3. In November 1985, authorization was granted for 
eligible firms to issue convertible bonds and 
depository receipts in foreign markets in amounts up to 
15 percent of their current market capitalization. 
4. In 1985, foreign securities companies were allowed to 
open representative offices and to own up to 10 percent 
of the paid-in capital of large Korean securities 
companies (the ratio was increased to 40 percent in 
1989) . 
In 1986 South Korea's current account balance turned 
positive. The positive current account balance kept growing 
in 1987 and 1988. Because of the relatively inflexible 
exchange rate, the significant current account surplus 
tended to cause money supply and the inflation rate to 
increase in the late 1980s. In order to reduce the external 
pressure for money growth, a number of capital outflow 
liberalization meas~res as well as capital inflow 
restrictions were implemented in the second half of 1980s 
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(Lindner 1992) .~ These measures are as follows: 
1. In August 1986, eligibility requirements for approval 
of new foreign commercial loans were tightened to 
discourage such borrowing. 
2. In 1987, large Korean securities companies, investment 
trust companies, and insurance companies were allowed 
to make direct investments in foreign capital markets. 
3. In May 1987, to encourage overseas investment by Korean 
firms, the upper limit for overseas investment exempted 
from prior government screening was raised from US$2 
million to US$3 million. 
4. In July 1987, certain tax privileges granted to attract 
foreign direct investment were reduced. 
5. In September 1987, restrictions on the purchase by 
Korean owned companies of foreign real estate were 
liberalized. 
6. In February 1989, requirements, such as the requirement 
concerning the credit standing of investors, on 
overseas investment were liberalized. 
7. In January 1990, the ceiling on the value of the 
63 Lindner notes that, in addition to the relaxation 
(restriction) of capital outflows (inflows), sterilization 
measures as well as the appreciation of Won were also used 
by the Korean government to reduce the external pressure for 
money growth in the 1986-1989 period. Since the 
liberalization of capital outflows has been reversed in part 
as the external surplus diminished since 1989, she further 
notes that the liberalization of capital controls in South 
Korea were undertaken with the purpose of reducing the 
inflationary impact of the balance of payment surplus rather 
than as a plan to improve the efficiency of Korea's economy. 
foreign investment subject to automatic approval was 
raised to US$100 million from US$3 million. 
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8. In March 1990, the limits on foreign exchange holdings 
for investment in foreign securities by domestic 
securities firms authorized to handle international 
business were increased to US$50 million from US$30 
million, and by insurance and investment firms, to 
US$30 million from US$10 million. 
Taiwan. Since July 1987, international capital flows 
have been significantly liberalized in Taiwan. At present, 
no permission is required for an individual company or 
person to remit outward (inward) up to $5 million ($1 
. 11 . ) 64 mi ion per year per person. Although capital flows are 
more liberalized in Taiwan than in South Korea, Taiwan, like 
South Korea, liberalized capital flows depending on the 
impact of current account surplus on domestic macroeconomic 
instability (Cunningham 1991) . 65 Before 1987, when the 
64 As the N.T. dollar was expected to appreciate, the 
initial (1987) inward remittance is limited at US$50,000 to 
prevent any significant inflow of "hot money". The 
restriction on the inflow was released gradually as Taiwan's 
balance of payments has adjusted satisfactorily and the 
expectation of further appreciation of N.T.$ was reduced 
(Chang 1990). 
65 In additional to pressure on the money supply and 
inflation rate, another external pressure from the trade 
surplus (accumulation of international reserves) is the 
possible retaliation from the deficit countries (especially 
the United States). The relaxation of controls on capital 
outflows will relieve the accumulation of international 
reserves and, therefore, the possibility of foreign 
countries' retaliation. 
109 
external pressure from the trade surplus was not significant 
in Taiwan, capital controls curbed capital outflows but did 
not effectively restrict capital inflows. Since 1987, as 
the external pressure grew, capital outflows were 
liberalized while inflows were restricted (Moreno and Yin 
1992). Some of Taiwan's major capital flow liberalizations 
in the 1980s are: 
1. Since late 1983, foreign investors have been allowed to 
make indirect investments in Taiwan's stock market 
through purchasing shares in four "Taiwan Funds" issued 
abroad. 
2. In July 1987, current account transactions were 
completely liberalized. Requirements to surrender 
export proceeds, advanced import deposits and 
restrictions on payment for invisibles were lifted. An 
individual or a company is allowed to purchase and 
remit outward up to an annual limit of US$5 million. A 
ceiling on inward remittances for each person or 
company was set at US$50,000 per year. 
3. Since liberalization in July 1987, the government has 
set up specific channels for people to invest in 
foreign securities. The transactions conducted through 
these channels are not subject to the US$5 million 
outward and US$50,000 inward limitations. One such 
channel is the so-called "Designated-Purpose Trust 
Program." Under this program, twelve local banks and 
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trust companies have been authorized to acquire mutual 
funds shares issued by foreign securities firms. 
Private investors can either invest in the foreign 
mutual funds through these institutions or entrust them 
to purchase other foreign securities on their behalf 
(Chang 1990). 
4. Another channel through which the public can invest in 
overseas securities is the·purchase of investment fund 
beneficial certificates. Since the late 1980s, four 
such funds managed by four local securities investment 
trust companies have been authorized by the government. 
The total capitalization for each fund is US$40 
million. 
5. In July 1989, the ceiling for inward remittances for 
each person each year was raised to US$200,000 (in 
September this number increased to US$500,000 and in 
November increased to US$1 million). 
Financial Market Integration 
Frankel and MacArthur (1988) and Frankel (1989) point 
out that the most appropriate way to measure the degree of 
financial market integration is to use the covered interest 
differential rather than the real interest rate linkage or 
the saving and investment rate correlation. However, as the 
forward discount rate, which is required in measuring 
covered interest rate differential, is not available for 
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both Taiwan and South Korea, our study will use the 
uncovered interest rate linkage to measure how well Taiwan's 
and South Korea's financial markets are integrated with the 
United States and Japanese financial markets. 66 
Some Background No~es 
According to Frankel and MacArthur (1988) and Frankel 
(1989), the difference between domestic and foreign real 
* interest rates (r - r) can be decomposed as, 
* . . * * 
r - r = ( 1 - 1 - fd) + ( fd - u) + (u - pi + pi ) 
where 
* i (i): the domestic (foreign) nominal interest rate 
fd: the forward discount rate on the domestic currency 
u: the expected rate of depreciation of the domestic 
currency 
[ 7 J 
... pi (p1): the domestic (foreign) expected inflation rate 
.. (i - i - fd): the covered interest differential 
(fd - u): the (exchange) risk premium 
. * (u - pi+ pi): the expected real depreciation of the 
domestic currency. 
Frankel and MacArthur (1988) and Frankel (1989) argue 
that since expected real depreciation (u - pi+ pi .. ) is 
determined by international goods (not financial) market 
56 See footnote 6 for a discussion on the issue of 
unavailability of South Korea's forward discount rate. 
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.,. 
integration, the covered interest differential (i - i - fd) 
is more appropriate than the real interest differential (r -
.,. 
r) in measuring financial market integration (or the degree 
of international capital mobility) • 67 Therefore, we 
conclude that the real interest rates "linkage" does not 
indicate accurately how the world's financial markets are 
integrated, because the linkage itself reflects both 
financial and goods markets integration. The covered 
interest differential, however, also has its limitation. 
Many countries, like Taiwan and South Korea, have no 
official forward markets (or the official forward rate are 
not available). Therefore, we cannot use the covered 
interest differential to measure how these countries' 
financial markets are integrated into the world financial 
markets. To overcome this problem, we rewrite equation [7] 
as, 
.,. 
" = (i - i . " - u) + (u - pi + pi ) [8] r - r 
where 
* (i - i - u) is the uncovered interest differential, which 
67 Frankel and MacArthur (1988) and Frankel (1989) 
refer to the covered interest differential as the political 
or country premium and the exchange risk premium and 
expected real depreciation as currency premium. Since the 
country premium captures all barriers (e.g. transactions 
costs, information costs, capital controls, risk of future 
capital controls, different tax laws across nations, and 
default risk) to financial market integration, they conclude 
that the covered interest differential (country premium) is 
most appropriate in measuring how financial markets are 
integrated across countries. 
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. * is the sum of covered interest differential (i - i - fd) 
and risk premium (fd - u). 
By estimating a value for the expected rate of 
depreciation, u, we can calculate the uncovered interest 
differential. However, because a (significant) risk premium 
may be included in uncoyered interest differential, Frankel 
and MacArthur (1988) and Frankel (1989) claim that the 
uncovered interest differential is not as good in measuring 
financial market integration as covered interest 
differential. 68 In our study, instead of using the 
uncovered interest differential, we will use the "linkage" 
between uncovered domestic and foreign nominal interest 
rates to measure how well Taiwan's and South Korea's 
financial markets are integrated with the U.S. and Japanese 
financial markets. The uncovered interest rate linkage 
should measure financial markets integration well since the 
risk premium will be included in the constant or error terms 
. th . 69 in e regression. More importantly, the uncovered 
68 They find that the means and variabilities of the 
exchange risk premia (fd - u) are significantly larger than 
the means and variabilities of the covered interest 
.. 
differentials (i - i - td). Because the uncovered interest 
differential includes significant risk (currency) premium, 
which, strictly speaking is not related to the financial 
market integration, they argue that the uncovered interest 
differential is not as good as covered interest differential 
in measuring financial market integration [see also footnote 
67 for the discussion of covered interest differential]. 
69 If the risk premium is constant, it will be captured 
in the constant term in the regression. If the risk premium 
i~ not constant (say it is a random variable), the mean of 
interest rates linkage, unlike the real interest rates 
linkage, will not reflect goods markets integration. 
Methodology 
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The equation that we will use to test for the uncovered 
interest rate linkage is: 
* i = a + b ( i + u) · + e [9] 
where i, i*, and u were defined previously and e is a random 
70 
error term. The difficulty in estimating equation [9] is 
that the expected rate of depreciation, u, is not 
observable. In this study, we will use the realized 
depreciation rate in place of the expected depreciation 
71 
rate. Assuming rational expectations, we have, 
u = ru + d 
where 
ru: the realized depreciation rate 
(10] 
the risk premia will be captured in the constant term and 
the random component of the risk premia will be captured in 
the error terms in the regression. 
70 The term i denotes the nominal interest rate in 
" Taiwan (Korea), i, the nominal interest rate in the U.S. 
(Japan), and u is the expected depreciation of N.T.$ (Won) 
against U.S.$ (Yen). Thus, a total of four equations will be 
estimated. 
71 · For a number of countries, the expected rate of 
depreciation is available from survey data. For example, 
Gavaglia, Verschoor and Wolff (1993) use survey data for the 
expected exchange rate to examine the bias in the forward 
discount of Asian currencies. However, as such data are not 
available for Taiwan and South Korea, this study can not 
apply survey data for the expected rate of depreciation. 
d: the expectational error 
Equation [10] states that the expected depreciation 
rate is the sum of the realized depreciation rate and 
expectational error. To test uncovered interest rate 
linkage, we substitute equation [10] into equation [9], 
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,* i = a + b ( 1 + ru) + ( e + bd) [ 11 J 
which depends only on observables. However, because the 
error term (e + bd) is correlated with the explanatory 
* variable (i + ru) (i.e. the realized depreciation rate, ru, 
is correlated with the expectational error, d), two stage 
least squares method is used in order to obtain consistent 
estimates. The instruments used must be uncorrelated with 
the expectational error term, d, and the linkage error term, 
e. The instruments that we choose here include a constant 
term, current inflation differential, lagged realized 
depreciation rate, and the foreign nominal interest rate, 
. * 1 . 
The hypothesis that domestic and foreign interest rates 
are not linked (or financial markets are not integrated) 
implies b = O. The greater the b coefficient, the higher 
the degree of domestic and foreign interest rate linkage 
(financial market integration). 
Data and Preliminary Analysis 
The nominal interest rate used for each country is: 
the Federal Funds rate for the United States, the overnight 
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money market rate for Japan and South Korea, and the 
(overnight) interbank rate for Taiwan. 72 For Taiwan {South 
Korea), the overnight interbank rate (money market rate) are 
the only available market determined interest rates. For 
South Korea, the United States, and Japan, data on the 
nominal interest rate, the exchange rate, and the pric~ 
level are taken from IMF International Financial Statistics. 
For Taiwan the data are taken either from the Financial 
Statistics, Taiwan District, R.O.C. or from the Financial 
Statistics Monthly, Taiwan District, R.O.C. All the data 
are monthly and span the period November 1986 through April 
1992 for South Korea and February 1981 through December 1991 
for Taiwan. For the United States and Japan, the data span 
February 1981 through April 1992. 73 
Given that all the variables in equation [11] are time-
series variables, two preliminary tests - unit-roots and co-
. 74 75 integration tests - are applied to each variables. 
72 According to International Financial Statistics 
(IFS), Japan's and South Korea's monthly Money Market Rates 
are defined as follows. Japan: From November 1990, lending 
rate for collateral and overnight loans in the Tokyo Call 
Money Market. Previously, lending rate for collateral and 
unconditional loans. South Korea: Average daily rate on 
call money, weighted by the volume of transactions. 
73 For all countries, the monthly interest rates are 
the average of daily rates. 
74 See Data and Preliminary Analysis section in Chapter 
III for the discussion of unit-roots and co-integration 
tests. 
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Table 30 reports the ADF tests for unit-roots of domestic 
and depreciation adjusted foreign interest rate [i.e. the 
sum of foreign interest rate and realized depreciation rate 
or the term (i* + ru) in equation (11)]. Because of the 
monthly nature of our data, twelve augmented lags are chosen 
for the ADF tests. Moreover, as the variable plots show no 
trend in all variables, we report only the "without trend" 
test statistics. 
With only one exception (JPMMRK), the test statistics 
in Table 30 show that most variables have unit-roots (or are 
not stationary). Therefore, in order to have correct 
statistical inferences in testing equation [11], it is 
necessary to take the first differences of all the variables 
in Table 30. 
Given that the variables in Table 30 are found to 
have a unit-root, we can then examine whether these 
variables are co-integrated. Table 31 reports the unit-root 
tests for residuals for four pairs of countries (i.e. 
Taiwan-u.s., Taiwan-Japan, Korea-u.s., and Korea-Japan). 
For each pair of countries, since two variables (i.e. 
75 Tables 29-31 report the unit-roots and co-
integration tests for the two variables case (i.e. domestic 
and depreciation adjusted foreign interest rates) of 
equation [11]. The unit-roots and co-integration tests for 
the three variables case (i.e. domestic and foreign interest 
rates and domestic realized depreciation rate) of equation 
[11] are reported in Appendix B. Like the two variables 
case, the three variables case also show that it is 
appropriate to take the first differences of all variables. 
Variable 
TWIBR 
USFFRT 
JPMMRT. 
KRMMR 
USFFRK 
JPMMRK 
TABLE 30 
AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER (ADF) 
UNIT-ROOT TESTS 
(TWO VARIABLES CASE) 1 
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Without Trend 
-2.56 
-2.60 
-2.53 
.10 
-.93 
-3.97+ 
1. For TWIBR, USFFRT, and JPMMRT (which cover the period 
1981M5-1991M12), the ADF(12) 95% critical value is -2.89. 
For KRMMR, USFFRK, and JPMMRK (which cover the period 
1986Mll-1992M4), the ADF(12) critical value is -2.92. A+ 
indicates that the null hypothesis (i.e., variable has unit-
root) can be rejected at the 95% level. 
2. TWIBR and KRMMR are Taiwan's interbank rate and South 
Korea's money market rate, respectively. USFFRT is the sum 
of the U.S. Federal Funds rate and Taiwan's realized 
depreciation rate with the U.S. JPMMRT is the sum of 
Japan's money market rate and Taiwan's realized depreciation 
rate with Japan. USFFRK is the sum of the U.S. Federal 
Funds rate and South Korea's realized depreciation rate with 
the U.S. JPMMRK is the sum of Japan's money market rate and 
South Korea's realized depreciation rate with Japan. 
Country 
Taiwan-u.s. 
Taiwan-u.s. 
Taiwan-Japan 
Taiwan-Japan 
Korea-u.s. 
Korea-u.s. 
Korea-Japan 
Korea-Japan 
TABLE 31 
CO-INTEGRATION TESTS 
UNIT-ROOT TESTS FOR RESIDUALS 
(TWO VARIABLES CASE) 1 
Regress and 
TWIBR 
USFFRT 
TWIBR 
JPMMRT 
KRMMR 
USFFRK 
KRMMR 
JPMMRK 
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ADF(12) 
-1.17 
-1.36 
-2.56 
-1.96 
-1.10 
-1. 71 
-1.73 
-1.91 
1. The 95% critical value is -3.3903 for the Taiwan-u.s. and 
Taiwan-Japan cases and is -3.4535 for the Korea-u.s. and 
Korea-Japan cases. 
2. See the notes to Table 30 for the definition and the time 
period covered by these variables. 
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domestic interest rate and depreciation adjusted foreign 
interest rate) can be used as regressands, the unit-root 
tests can be applied to two sets of residuals. Since the 
ADF(l2) test statistics are not significant (i.e. the null 
hypothesis that the residuals have a unit-root cannot be 
rejected) in any cases, we can conclude that the variables 
i and (i* + ru) in equation [11] are not co-integrated in 
any cases. Therefore, taking the first differences of these 
variables is appropriate. 
Table 32 reports the number of co-integrating vectors 
(r) from the Johansen maximum-likelihood-ratio test. The 
table shows that the hypothesis that the number of co-
integrating vectors is equal to zero (less than or equal to 
one) cannot be rejected at both the 95% and 90% levels in 
the Korean (Taiwan) 76 cases. This result, which is 
consistent with the results from the unit-root tests for 
variables, confirms that the variables i and (i* + ru) in 
equation [11] are not stationary. Therefore, we are assured 
that it is legitimate to take the first differences of these 
variables in all cases. 
Empirical Results 
This section presents the results from estimating 
equation (11]. Since we are using first differenced data, 
76 At only the 95% level, the number of co-integrating 
vectors equal to zero cannot be rejected for all cases. 
Country 
TW-US 
TW-JP 
KR-US 
KR-JP 
TABLE 32 
CO-INTEGRATION TESTS 
JOHANSEN MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD RATIO TESTS 
(TWO VARIABLES CASE) 1 
Null Alternative statistic 95% c. v. 
r ::; 1 r = 2 7.27 9.24 
r ::; 1 r = 2 6.34 9.24 
r = 0 r = 1 11.89 15.67 
r = 0 r = 1 8.97 15.67 
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90% c.v. 
7.53 
7.53 
13.75 
13.75 
1. r represent the number of co-integrating vectors. 
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the constant term is omitted from the estimation. 77 
Moreover, in order to resolve the simultaneity problem, two 
stage least squares is used. Table 33 reports the linkage 
between domestic (i.e. Taiwan's and South Korea's) and 
depreciation adjusted foreign (i.e. U.S. and Japan's) 
interest rates. It shows that, over the period 1981M3-
1991M4, Taiwan's interbank rate is significantly correiated 
with the depreciation adjusted U.S. Federal Funds rate at 
the 95% level. The estimated coefficient is .429, which 
implies that for a one percentage point increase in the 
adjusted U.S. Federal Funds rate, Taiwan's interbank rate 
will increase by .429 percentage point. Taiwan's interbank 
rate, however, is not significantly correlated with the 
depreciation adjusted Japanese money market rate. Table 33 
also shows that, over the period 1986M12-1992M4, South 
Korea's money market rate is not significantly correlated 
with either the depreciation adjusted U.S. Federal Funds 
rate or the depreciation adjusted Japan's money market rate. 
Which means, during this period, neither U.S. nor Japan's 
interest rate movement will significantly affect South 
Korea's interest rate movement. 
The results of Table 33 imply that, during the 1980s 
and early 1990s, Taiwan's financial market was significantly 
77 The test results with the constant term do not show 
significant difference from what we have reported in this 
study. In all cases, the constant terms are very small and 
not significantly different from zero. 
Country 
TW-US 
TW-JP 
KR-US 
KR-JP 
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TABLE 33 
LINKAGE BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND DEPRECIATION 
ADJUSTED FOREIGN INTEREST RATES (2SLS) 
1981M3 - 1991M1212 
Variable 
USFFRT 
JPMMRT 
USFFRK 
JPMMRK 
Coefficient 
.429 
.088 
.581 
.712 
St. Err. 
.210 
.399 
.483 
.466 
T-Stat.(Prob) 
2.045 [.041)+ 
.221 [.825] 
1.201 [.234) 
1.528 [.132) 
1. For the KR-US and KR-JP cases, the estimating period is 
1986M12 - 1992M4. 
2. The instruments used include an intercept term, current 
domestic and foreign inflation differential, three lags of 
the realized depreciation rate, and current foreign nominal 
interest rate. All of the variables and the instruments are 
the first differences. A+ indicates that the coefficient 
is significant at the 95% level. 
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linked to the U.S.financial market while South Korea's 
financial market was not significantly linked with either 
the U.S. or Japan's financial market. 78 This finding is 
consistent with the process of financial liberalization in 
Taiwan and South Korea during the 1980s and early 1990s (as 
we presented previously). That is, since interest rate and 
capital flows have not been liberalized in South Korea, 
Korea's short-term interest rate is not linked with foreign 
79 interest rates. On the contrary, since Taiwan's interest 
rate and capital flows have been significantly liberalized, 
Taiwan's short-term interest rate is linked with foreign 
(especially, the U.S.) interest rate.~ 
78 As both Taiwan's and South Korea's interest rates 
are not completely linked to foreign interest rates, the 
monetary policies in these two countries are still 
effective. This result is similar to Fry (1992), who uses 
the offset coefficient (between domestic credit and capital 
flows) to examine the effectiveness of monetary policy in 
six Pacific Basin developing countries (Indonesia, South 
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand). Since 
the joint offset coefficient for these countries is 
significantly less than one, Fry concludes the monetary 
authorities in these countries can control their money 
supplies by control domestic credit in the short run. 
79 As we have noted previously, although a lot of long-
term capital flows were liberalized in the late 1980s in 
South Korea, short-term arbitrage type of capital flows were 
not liberalized. Since the (short-term) interest rate 
linkage (and thus the financial market integration) depends 
mainly on the short-term capital flows, South Korea's 
interest rate is not linked with foreign interest rates. 
80 One possible reason which may explain why Taiwan's 
interest rate is significantly linked to the U.S. but not to 
Japan's interest rate is because Japan's financial market is 
not as open as the U.S. financial market. Moreover, as the 
U.S. is the largest export market for Taiwan, the U.S. 
economic condition (which includes the levels of U.S. 
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Finally, since the financial markets have been 
liberalized gradually in both Taiwan and South Korea, it is 
of interest to test whether the interest rate linkage has 
increased over the years in both countries. Tables 34 
reports part of the Chow test statistics which covers the 
dates of significant regime shifts for Taiwan-u.s., Taiwan-
a1 Japan, Korea-u.s., and Korea-Japan cases. In Table 34, 
significant regime shifts are shown in early 1987 for the 
Taiwan-U.S. case and early 1986 for the Taiwan-Japan case. 
For both the South Korea-U.S. and South Korea-Japan cases, 
significant regime shifts are shown in mid-1988. Based on 
these regime shifts, Table 35 reports the linkage 
coefficients for the periods 1981M3-1987M6 and 1987M7-
1991Ml2 for the Taiwan cases and 1986Ml2-1988M6 and 1988M7-
1992M4 for the South Korean cases.u It is shown that, in 
both South Korean cases, the interest rate linkages are 
greater in the second period than in the first period. 
Although none of the linkage coefficient is significant, 
interest rate) "traditionally" has a significant impact on 
Taiwan's economic condition. 
81 th • d • In e Taiwan-US an Taiwan-Japan cases, 130 
observations are used in the Chow tests. In the South 
Korea-u.s. and South Korea-Japan cases, 65 observations are 
used. 
82 In the two Taiwan cases, we use 1987M7 as the break 
point is because beginning July 1987 the capital flows were 
significantly liberalized in Taiwan (see the earlier 
discussion on financial liberalization in Taiwan). 
Moreover, this break point is close to the dates of regime 
shifts for both cases. 
126 
TABLE 34 
TEST STATISTICS FROM THE CHOW TESTS 
(COVERS MAJOR REGIME SHIFTS) 1 
TAIWAN - us TAIWAN-JAPAN KOREA - us KOREA-JAPAN 
Time Stat. Time Stat. Time Stat. Time Stat. 
86Ml .37 85Ml 21.77 87M2 .46 87M2 .21 
86M2 .51 85M2 20.91 87M3 .52 87M3 .26 
86M3 .66 85M3 21. 34 87M4 .58 87M4 .25 
86M4 .97 85M4 19.84 87M5 .78 87M5 .15 
86M5 1.25 85M5 18.35 87M6 1.20 87M6 .04 
86M6 1.56 85M6 17.41 87M7 1.45 87M7 .01 
86M7 1.79 85M7 15.93 87M8 1.66 87M8 .08 
86M8 2.10 85M8 14.84 87M9 1. 71 87M9 .34 
86M9 2.36 85M9 14.98 87Ml0 2.30 87Ml0 .45 
86Ml0 2.60 85Ml0 13.61 87Mll 2.73 87Mll .64 
86Mll 2.79 85Mll 11. 62 87Ml2 3.10 87Ml2 .71 
86Ml2 3.11 85Ml2 9.26 88Ml 3.39 88Ml .76 
87Ml 3.50 86Ml 6.57 88M2 3.67 88M2 1. 00 
87M2 3.87 86M2 5.09 88M3 3.87 88M3 1.28 
87M3 4.22 86M3 4.43 88M4 4.04 88M4 1.54 
87M4 4.66 86M4 3.58 88M5 4.33 88M5 1.97 
87M5 5.07 86M5 3.10 88M6 4.78 88M6 2.50 
87M6 5.66 86M6 2.83 88M7 5.44 88M7 3.08 
87M7 6.39 86M7 2.60 88M8 6.23 88M8 3.51 
87M8 6.43 86M8 2.26 88M9 6.99 88M9 4.14 
87M9 7.00 86M9 1.96 88Ml0 7.87 88Ml0 4.64 
87Ml0 7.75 86Ml0 1.66 88Mll 9.49 88Mll 4.58 
87Mll 8.86 86Mll 1.47 88Ml2 11.92 88Ml2 4.82 
87Ml2 9.73 86Ml2 1. 35 89Ml 14.82 89Ml 4.75 
1. The critical value of F c1 , 12a, 5:i:, for the Taiwan-u. s. and 
Taiwan-Japan cases is around 3.92. The critical value of 
F Cl,63,5:tJ for the Korea-u.s. and Korea-Japan cases is around 
4.00. 
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TABLE 35 
LINKAGE COEFFICIENTS IN TWO SUBPERIODS 
BASED ON SIGNIFICANT REGIME SHIFTS 12 
cty. Variable Period Coeff. Sd.Err. T-Stat.[Prob] 
TW-US USFFRT 81M3-87M6 .504 .166 3.039 [.003]+ 
TW-US USFFRT 87M7-91M12 -.297 .901 -.329 [.743] 
TW-JP JPMMRT 81M3-87M6 .107 .363 .296 [. 768] 
TW-JP JPMMRT 87M7-91M12 -.031 .968 -.032 [.975] 
KR-US USFFRK 86M12-88M6 -.125 .350 -.359 [.724] 
KR-US USFFRK 88M7-92M4 1.162 .738 1. 574 [.123] 
KR-JP JPMMRK 86M12-88M6 .172 .505 .341 [.737] 
KR-JP JPMMRK 88M7-92M4 .808 .596 1. 355 [ • 18 2] 
1. See note to Table 30 and Table 33 for the definition of 
variables and the instruments used in the tests. 
2. A+ indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 
95% level. 
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this finding is consistent with our expectation, that is, as 
South Korea's financial market was liberalized in the second 
period, the linkage between domestic and foreign rates 
increased. The case of Taiwan is counterintuitive. Table 
35 shows that, in both Taiwan-u.s. and Taiwan-Japan cases, 
the linkage coefficient in the second period is smaller than 
in the first period and is negative (but not significant). 
However, the coefficient for the first period in the Taiwan-
U.S. case is significant. Table 36, based on major 
financial policy changes in Taiwan and South Korea, reports 
the linkage coefficients for the periods 1981M3-1989M6 and 
1989M7-1991M12 for the Taiwan cases and 1986M12-1989M12 and 
83 1990Ml-1992M4 for the South Korea cases. The Chow test 
statistics which covers the dates of major financial policy 
changes in both Taiwan and South Korea are presented in 
Table 37. Like the results shown in Table 35, Table 36 
exhibits that, in both South Korea cases, the linkage 
coefficients are greater in the second period than in the 
first period, but none of the coefficient is significant. 
In the Taiwan-u.s. case, the second period coefficient is 
still smaller and negative (but not significant). In the 
Taiwan-Japan case, the second period coefficient turns to be 
83 The reason we choose July 1989 as the break point in 
the Taiwan case is because since July 1989, Taiwan has 
removed all the maximum and minimum constraints on the 
bank's loan rate and the maximum constraint on the bank's 
deposit rate. Choosing January 1990 as the break point in 
the South Korea case is because in 1990, South Korea has 
fully liberalized the interbank rate. 
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TABLE 36 
LINKAGE COEFFICIENTS IN TWO SUBPERIODS 
BASED ON FINANCIAL POLICIES CHANGES 1 
Cty. Variable Period Coe ff. Sd.Err. T-Stat.[Prob] 
TW-US USFFRT 81M3-89M6 .478 .194 2.461 [.016]+ 
TW-US USFFRT 89M7-91M12 -.655 1.315 -.498 [.622] 
TW-JP JPMMRT 81M3-89M6 .028 .398 .071 [.944] 
TW-JP JPMMRT 89M7-91M12 .428 1.275 .336 [.740] 
KR-US USFFRK 86M12-89M12 .345 .505 .682 [.499] 
KR-US USFFRK 90Ml-92M4 1. 067 .971 1.099 [.282] 
KR-JP JPMMRK 86M12-89M12 .273 .589 .464 [. 645] 
KR-JP JPMMRK 90Ml-92M4 1.019 .733 1. 390 [.176] 
1. See note to Table 30 and Table 33 for the definition of 
variables and the instruments used in the tests. 
2. A+ indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 
95% level. 
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TABLE 37 
TEST STATISTICS FROM THE CHOW TESTS 
(COVERS POLICY CHANGES) 1 
TAIWAN - us TAIWAN-JAPAN KOREA - us KOREA-JAPAN 
Time Stat. Time Stat. Time Stat. Time Stat. 
89Ml 30.34 89Ml .95 89M2 18.87 89M2 4.85 
89M2 37.53 89M2 .87 89M3 21. 37 89M3 6.35 
89M3 45.79 89M3 .85 89M4 23.71 89M4 8.81 
89M4 60.26 89M4 .76 89M5 27.25 89M5 11.36 
89M5 54.53 89M5 1.33 89M6 29.74 89M6 15.21 
89M6 48.54 89M6 2.14 89M7 33.75 89M7 16.45 
89M7 50.82 89M7 2.50 89M8 35.71 89M8 19.05 
89M8 54.70 89M8 2.73 89M9 40.37 89M9 18.96 
89M9 53.88 89M9 3.30 89M10 44.60 89M10 19.32 
89M10 58.44 89M10 3.44 89Mll 45.03 89Mll 21.13 
89Mll 58.12 89Mll 3.89 89M12 44.25 89Ml2 22.92 
89M12 67.58 89M12 3.38 90Ml 46.83 90Ml 20.48 
90Ml 78.03 90Ml 2.85 90M2 53.26 90M2 15.15 
90M2 67.92 90M2 3.75 90M3 62.11 90M3 11.40 
90M3 51.52 90M3 5.76 90M4 72.10 90M4 8.75 
90M4 36.88 90M4 8.65 90M5 73.82 90MS 8.07 
90M5 29.23 90M5 10.89 90M6 75.18 90M6 7.15 
90M6 26.83 90M6 11.58 90M7 79.93 90M7 5.73 
90M7 21. 07 90M7 13.87 90M8 85.55 90M8 4.17 
90M8 15.20 90M8 16.90 90M9 93.87 90M9 2.66 
90M9 12.10 90M9 18.52 90M10 110.14 90M10 1.19 
90M10 13.50 90M10 16.21 90Mll 132.96 90Mll .41 
90Mll 17.22 90Mll 13.02 90M12 154.21 90M12 .OS 
90M12 20.64 90Ml2 10.38 91Ml 169.50 91Ml .11 
1. See note to Table 34. 
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greater than the first period coefficient, but none of them 
is significant. One possible explanation for the result 
that the second period coefficients are smaller in most 
Taiwan cases is, since early 1989, as part of the 
liberalization process, Taiwan has removed all the maximum 
and minimum constraints on the bank's loan ~ate and the 
maximum constraint on the bank's deposit rate. Since then, 
Taiwan's interbank rate has fluctuated wildly in response to 
domestic financial conditions (as shown in Figure 9). If 
short-term arbitrage type of capital flows are not 
significant in Taiwan, the interest rate linkage 
d . u isappears. 
Summary and Conclusion 
Since the early 1980s, Taiwan and South Korea have 
initiated a number of financial liberalization policies. As 
the economy of both countries has grown significantly over 
the past few decades, liberalization of the financial 
markets was considered necessary in order to mobilize and 
84 If the short-term arbitrage type of capital flows 
are not significant, then the differences between domestic 
and foreign interest rate will persist and the linkage will 
be small. This may be the case of Taiwan. Although no 
sufficient data to support our view in this study, we 
believe that most of the capital flows in Taiwan are for the 
purposes of direct foreign investment, overseas investment 
(e.g. investment in overseas real estate), and long-term 
portfolio investment (e.g. foreign mutual fund investment). 
If this is the case, then we can explain why the interest 
rate linkage disappeared in the second period, when 
interbank rate fluctuate significantly in Taiwan. 
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use efficiently financial assets. A successful financial 
liberalization needs to be carefully planned. The 
appropriate sequence, speed, and coverage of different types 
of liberalization are of great importance (Kuo 1990). 
Among different liberalization policies, the 
liberalization of capital flows are imperative to increase 
the integration of domestic and foreign financial markets. 
With liberalized interest rates, capital mobility will 
equalize domestic and forward discount adjusted foreign 
interest rates. In this study, we have used the uncovered 
interest linkage to examine how Taiwan's and South Korea's 
financial markets are integrated with the U.S. and Japan's 
financial markets. Although many liberalization policies 
have been implemented in Taiwan and South Korea in the 1980s 
and early 1990s, the liberalization of interest rates and 
capital flows is not complete in both countries, especially 
in South Korea. The empirical test results show that 
Taiwan's short-term interest rate is linked to the U.S. 
short-term interest rate but not to Japan's. South Korea's 
short-term interest rate is not linked to either the U.S. or 
Japan's short-term interest rate. This finding, is 
consistent with the degree to which Taiwan and South Korea 
have liberalized their financial markets. It implies that 
Taiwan's degree of financial market integration with rest of 
the world is greater than South Korea's. However, since the 
linkage between Taiwan's and the U.S. interest rates is not 
complete (i.e. less than one), we conclude that Taiwan's 
monetary and other stabilization policies are still 
effective. 
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Finally, since financial liberalization policies are 
implemented gradually in both Taiwan and South Korea, we 
have tested how the interest rate linkage has changed over 
the years in both countries. The break points are 
determined by both the significant regime shifts (from the 
Chow tests) as well as by the major financial policy changes 
in Taiwan and South Korea. We find that, in all the South 
Korean cases, the linkage coefficients are higher in the 
second period than in the first period, as expected. 
However, none of the coefficient is significant. The 
results for the Taiwan cases are counterintuitive. In most 
cases, the coefficients are smaller and have a negative sign 
in the second period. One possible explanation for this 
finding is that, since early 1989, Taiwan's interbank rate 
has fluctuated very significantly. This fluctuation may due 
to the full liberalization of bank deposit and loan rates at 
the same time. If short-term arbitrage type of capital 
flows (to capture domestic and foreign interest 
differential) are not significant in Taiwan, the domestic 
and foreign short-term interest rate differential will 
persist and the interest rate linkage will disappear (in the 
second period). 
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APPENDIX A 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATIONS 
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TABLE 38 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATION 
TAIWAN - U.S. 
1973Q2 - 1991Q4 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
INPT 
q 
q(-1) 
q(-2) 
q(-3) 
q(-4) 
q(-5) 
q(-6) 
q(-7) 
q(-8) 
y 
y (-1) 
Y(-2) 
Y* 
Y*(-1) 
Y*(-2) 
OW-statistics 
3428.0 
96549.1 
-92134.3 
205624.4 
-87428.6 
175516.4 
-161859.8 
139350.0 
-64751. 0 
-20442.9 
-36356.8 
13406.4 
-138698.8 
108741. 5 
66032.0 
70494.8 
2.512 
2836.0 
99826.1 
120901.4 
169978.0 
125769.9 
199430.6 
191157.5 
141701. 4 
111735.1 
61960.1 
55632.6 
43064.4 
64189.4 
133625.9 
160283.0 
119143.4 
Sargan's CHI-SQ(ll) 
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T-Ratio[Prob] 
1.209(.232] 
.967(.337] 
-.762(.449] 
1.210[ .231] 
-.695(.490] 
.880(.382] 
-.847(.401] 
.983[.329] 
-.580(.564] 
-.330(.743] 
-.654(.516] 
.311(.757] 
-2.161(.035] 
.814(.419] 
.412(.682] 
.592(.556] 
.824(1.001 
Note: The q, Y, and Y* are the first-differences of logged 
real exchange rate and domestic and foreign real output 
respectively. The OW-statistics show whether the regression 
residuals have first-order serial correlation. Since the 
DW- statistics is greater than du (the upper bound of 
Durbin-Watson distribution) at the 95% level, we accept the 
null hypothesis and conclude there is no positive serial 
correlation. Sargan's misspecification test is a general 
test of misspecification of the model and the instruments. 
This test statistic is asymptotically distributed as a chi-
squared variate with s-k degrees of freedom, wheres 
represents the number of instruments and k represents the 
number of regressors. Since the Sargan statistic is not 
significant at the 95% level, we conclude that the null 
hypothesis of correct model specification and valid 
instruments cannot be rejected. 
TABLE 39 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATION 
TAIWAN - JAPAN 
1973Q2 - 1991Q4 
Regressor 
INPT 
coefficient .standard Error 
q 
q(-1) 
q(-2) 
q(-3) 
q(-4) 
q(-5) 
q(-6) 
q(-7) 
q(-8) 
y 
y (-1) 
Y(-2) 
Y* 
Y*(-1) 
Y*(-2) 
ow-statistics 
231.8 
-2509.7 
4755.7 
-75.6 
-7494.7 
6404.9 
7882.7 
-4655.5 
4170.3 
-703.3 
-11765.1 
-8182.4 
-1575.0 
3320.6 
4951.7 
-3116.2 
2.161 
Note: See note to Table 38. 
263.2 
5862.4 
4497.0 
4337.4 
4192.6 
4938.2 
5335.6 
6265.0 
6245.4 
4626.7 
4419.0 
5311. 7 
5346.0 
15763.0 
15597.3 
13233.4 
Sargan's CHI-SO(l5) 
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T-Ratio[Prob] 
.881(.382] 
-.428(.670] 
1.058(.295] 
-.017(.986] 
-1.788(.079] 
1.297(.200] 
1.477(.145] 
-.743(.460] 
.668(.507] 
-.152(.880] 
-2.662(.010] 
-1.541(.129] 
-.295(.769] 
.211(.834] 
.317(.752] 
-.235[.815] 
23.93[.066] 
TABLE 40 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATION 
SOUTH KOREA - U.S. 
1973Q2 - 1991Q4 
Regressor Coefficient 
INPT 41675.7 
q -684214.4 
q(-1) -610651.0 
q(-2) 377437.8 
q(-3) 99767.6 
g(-4) -14097.7 
q(-5) 498009.9 
q(-6) 844905.9 
g(-7) 272615.4 
q(-8) 396228.0 
Y -677433.6 
Y(-1) -270165.2 
Y(-2) -760030.2 
Y* 3766941.0 
Y*(-1) -189876.9 
Y*(-2) -736320.1 
OW-statistics 2.070 
Note: See note to Table 38. 
Standard Error 
32063.1 
790431. 6 
954001. 3 
756051.9 
689641. 4 
698153.3 
698514.1 
727617.4 
755352.0 
576882.1 
665552.3 
644597.0 
646118.3 
1304446.0 
1784783.0 
1434324.0 
Sargan's CHI-SO(ll) 
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T-Ratio[Prob] 
1.299(.199] 
-.866(.390] 
-.640(.525] 
.499(.619] 
.145(.885] 
-.020(.984] 
.713[.479] 
1. 161 [. 250] 
.361(.719] 
.687(.495] 
-1.018[.313] 
-.419[.677] 
-1.176[.244] 
2.888(.005] 
-.106(.916] 
-.513[.610] 
14.65[.199] 
Regress or 
INPT 
q 
q(-1) 
q(-2) 
q(-3) 
q(-4) 
q(-5) 
q(-6) 
q(-7) 
q(-8) 
y 
y (-1) 
Y(-2) 
Y* 
Y*(-1) 
Y*(-2) 
TABLE 41 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATION 
SOUTH KOREA - JAPAN 
1973Q2 - 1991Q4 
Coefficient 
-12134.0 
101226.7 
-548119.2 
-96646.0 
489258.0 
-64558.0 
-528491.6 
-61735.6 
352868.4 
154629.3 
78045.2 
-689386.1 
789500.9 
1061577.0 
-1626584.0 
746476.6 
Standard Error 
24486.8 
280764.2 
406912.9 
334213.3 
262465.0 
343463.4 
359179.0 
330773.2 
252661. 2 
236320.5 
465113.9 
476566.5 
615330.0 
868940.2 
1015751. 0 
729992.8 
OW-statistics 2.257 Sargan's CHI-S0(15) 
Note: See note to Table 38. 
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T-Ratio[Probl 
-.496(.622] 
.361(.720] 
-1.347(.183] 
-.289(.773] 
1.864(.067] 
-.188(.852] 
-1.471(.147] 
-.187(.853] 
1.397(.168] 
.654(.515] 
.168(.867] 
-1 .• 4 4 7 [ • 15 3 ] 
1.283(.204] 
1.222(.227] 
-1. 601 [ .115] 
1.023(.3111 
8.650(.8951 
Reqressor 
INPT 
q 
q(-1) 
q(-2) 
q(-3) 
q(-4) 
q(-5) 
q(-6) 
q(-7) 
q(-8) 
y 
Y(-1) 
Y(-2) 
Y* 
Y*(-1) 
Y*(-2) 
OW-statistics 
TABLE 42 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATION 
TAIWAN - REST OF THE WORLD 
1973Q2 - 1991Q4 
Coefficient 
15.3 
79.1 
-45.0 
816.8 
-349.7 
345.7 
-215.8 
574.0 
117.5 
-142.9 
-1. 9 
-35.4 
-270.0 
1022.8 
-980.0 
-2.6 
2.436 
Standard Error 
11.2 
342.9 
430.2 
516.9 
451.1 
640.9 
474.7 
426.6 
311. 0 
192.6 
200.7 
148.4 
192.4 
736.1 
766.7 
502.1 
Sargen's CHI-SQ(ll) 
Note: See note to Table 38. 
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T-Ratio(Prob] 
1.374(.175] 
.231(.818] 
-.104(.917] 
1.580(.119] 
-.775(.441] 
.539(.592] 
-.455(.651] 
1.346(.184] 
.378(.707] 
-.742(.461] 
-.009(.993] 
-.238(.812] 
-1.403(.166] 
1.390(.170] 
-1.278[ .206] 
-.005(.9961 
8.507(.667] 
Regress or 
INPT 
q 
q(-1) 
q(-2) 
q(-3) 
q(-4) 
q(-5) 
q(-6) 
q(-7) 
q(-8) 
y 
y (-1) 
Y(-2) 
Y* 
Y*(-1) 
Y*(-2) 
OW-statistics 
TABLE 43 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATION 
SOUTH KOREA - REST OF THE WORLD 
1973Q2 - 1991Q4 
Coefficient 
316.5 
1616.0 
-10154.8 
8841. 3 
-579.7 
-4799.7 
3631.4 
7329.2 
2636.2 
9063.1 
6059.2 
-767.8 
-16296.4 
21830.4 
-12995.9 
3083.0 
2.352 
Standard Error 
294.6 
6881. 3 
8899.8 
7629.7 
6399.3 
7805.0 
7815.0 
6312.6 
6351. 6 
5303.9 
5834. 0 . 
6256.3 
6462.7 
15728.2 
22098.0 
15010.3 
Sargan's CHI-SQ(ll) 
Note: See note to Table 38. 
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T..;.Ratio[Prob] 
1.075(.287] 
.235(.815] 
-1.141(.258] 
1.159(.251] 
-.091(.928] 
-.615(.541] 
.465(.644] 
1.161(.250] 
.415(.680] 
1.709(.093] 
1.039(.303] 
-.123(.903] 
-2.522(.014] 
1.388(.170] 
-.588(.559] 
.205(.838] 
18.19(.077] 
APPENDIX B 
UNIT-ROOTS AND CO-INTEGRATION TESTS 
(THREE VARIABLES CASE} 
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Variable 
TWIBR 
USFFR 
TWRDU 
JPMMR 
TWRDJ 
KRMMR 
KRRDU 
KRRDJ 
TABLE 44 
AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER (ADF) 
UNIT-ROOT TESTS 
(THREE VARIABLES CASE) 1 
149 
Without Trend 
-2.56 
-2.64 
-2.87 
-2.66 
-2.99+ 
.10 
-1. 00 
-1. 37 
1. For TWIBR, USFFR, TWRDU, JPMMR, and TWRDJ (which cover 
the period 1981M5-1991M12), the ADF(12) 95% critical value 
is -2.89. For KRMMR, KRRDU, and KRRDJ (which cover the 
period 1986Mll-1992M4), the ADF(12) critical value is -2.92. 
A+ indicates that the null hypothesis (i.e., variable has 
unit-root) can be rejected at the 95% level. 
2. TWIBR, USFFR, JPMMR, and KRMMR are Taiwan's interbank 
rate, U.S. Federal Funds rate, Japan's money market rate, 
and South Korea's money market rate, respectively. TWRDU, 
TWRDJ, KRRDU, and KRRDJ are Taiwan's realized depreciation 
rate with the United States, Taiwan's realized depreciation 
rate with Japan, South Korea's realized depreciation rate 
with the United states, and South Korea's realized 
depreciation rate with Japan, respectively. 
Country 
Taiwan-u.s. 
Taiwan-u.s. 
Taiwan-U.S. 
Taiwan-Japan 
Taiwan-Japan 
Taiwan-Japan 
Korea-u.s. 
Korea-u.s. 
Korea-u.s. 
Korea-Japan 
Korea-Japan 
Korea-Japan 
TABLE 45 
CO-INTEGRATION TESTS 
UNIT-ROOT TESTS FOR RESIDUALS 
(THREE VARIABLES CASE) 1 
Regressand 
TWIBR 
USFFR 
TWRDU 
TWIBR 
JPMMR 
TWRDJ 
KRMMR 
USFFR 
KRRDU 
KRMMR 
JPMMR 
KRRDJ 
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ADF(l2) 
-1.10 
-1. 34 
-4.00+ 
-3.06 
-1.93 
-3.47 
-1.70 
-1. 70 
-1.85 
-1. 75 
-1.61 
-2.35 
1. The 95% critical value is -3.8146 for the Taiwan-u.s. and 
Taiwan-Japan cases and is -3.9053 for the Korea-u.s. and 
Korea-Japan cases. 
2. See the notes to Table 44 for the definition of these 
variables. Variables for the Taiwan-u.s and Taiwan-Japan 
cases covers the period 1981M2-1991M12. Variables for the 
Korea-u.s. and Korea-Japan cases covers the period 1986Mll-
1992M4. A+ indicates that the null hypothesis (i.e. the 
residuals has unit-root) can be rejected at the 95% level. 
Country 
TW-US 
TW-JP 
KR-US 
KR-JP 
TABLE 46 
CO-INTEGRATION TESTS 
JOHANSEN MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD RATIO TESTS 
(THREE VARIABLES CASE) 1 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% c.v. 
r $ 1 r = 2 12.68 15.67 
r $ 1 r = 2 12.86 15.67 
r = 0 r = 1 14.33 22.00 
r < 1 r = 2 11. 28 15.67 
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90% c.v. 
13.75 
13.75 
19.77 
13.75 
1. r represent the number of co-integrating vectors. 
APPENDIX C 
SOUTH KOREA'S (1980-1990) AND TAIWAN'S 
(1979-1991) FINANCIAL SECTOR POLICIES 
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South Korea's Financial Sectors Policies 
1980-1990 
February. 1. A new exchange rate regime was introduced 
whereby the won was linked to a multicurrency basket, but 
other factors would also be taken into account in 
determining the exchange rate. The U.S. dollar remained the 
intervention currency. 2. Foreign exchange certificates 
were abolished. 
July. Authorization was granted for forward exchange 
transactions between the Korean won and specified foreign 
currencies. 
Seotember. Different measures were introduced to 
encourage foreign direct investment. 
October. Foreign exchange control regulations were 
revised with a view to rationalizing and simplifying various 
regulations. One of the revisions was the relaxation of the 
regulations for the purchase of foreign securities. 
June. Preferential interest rates applied to various 
policy loans were abolished to gradually phase out policy 
loans. 
May. Limitations were abolished on the eligibility of 
foreign currencies for forward transactions against the 
Korean won. (Previously eligibility was limited to the U.S. 
dollar, the pound sterling, the deutsche mark, and the 
Japanese yen. ) 
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January. A narrow band of 0.5 percent (i.e. from 10 to 
10.5 percent) in bank loans was introduced in order to 
permit banks to charge different rates based on a borrower's 
creditworthiness. In November, this band was further 
widened to 1.5 percent (i.e. from 10 to 11.5 percent). 
April. In a liberalization of the rules under which 
foreign bank branches could operate in Korea, the Ministry 
of Finance announced that henceforth foreign banks would be 
allowed to join the National Bankers' Association. 
July. A revised Foreign Capital Inducement Act came into 
effect. The law expands the industrial sectors for foreign 
investment. 
November. The ceiling on interbank call rate was lifted 
and the rates on issuance of corporate bonds (except for 
those guaranteed by banks) were liberalized. 
March. The value limit on investment trusts through 
which foreign residents could indirectly invest in Korean 
bonds and equity was raised by US$30 million. Increases of 
the same amount were made on April 19 and April 30, 1985, 
raising the limit to US$200 million. 
October. Authorization was granted for foreign 
participation in 102 of the 339 previously restricted 
industrial areas, increasing the number of industrial 
sectors accessible to :foreign investors from 660 to 762, and 
raising the liberalization ratio for capital from 66.1 
percent to 76.3 percent of total. 
November. Authorization was granted for eligible firms 
to issue convertible bonds and depository receipts abroad in 
amounts up to 15 percent of their current market 
capitalization. 
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August. Eligibility requirements for approval of new 
foreign commercial loans were tightened to discourage such 
borrowing, while ensuring that Korean borrowers contracted 
foreign loans on the best possible terms. 
May. To encourage overseas investment by Korean firms, 
the upper limit for overseas investment exempted from prior 
government screening was raised from US$2 million to US$3 
million. 
July. Certain tax privileges granted to attract foreign 
direct investment were reduced and after-investment controls 
relaxed to put foreign-invested companies and local 
companies on the same basis. 
September. Restrictions on the purchase by Korean-owned 
companies of foreign real estate were liberalized. 
October. The regulations on the duration of forward 
exchange contracts between the won and foreign currencies, 
previously limited to one year or less, were abolished. 
December. overseas investments by Korean residents of 
less than US$1 million were to be automatically approved, 
compared to US$500,000 in the past, and the upper limit on 
investment to be free from government screening was 
increased from US$3 million to US$5 million, regardless of 
purposes of investment. 
January. The restrictions on foreign investment in the 
Korean insurance industry were liberalized. 
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March. 1. The limit on foreign exchange holdings for 
investment in foreign securities by Korean securities firms 
authorized to handle international businesses was raised 
from US$10 million to US$30 million. Insurance and 
investment trust firms were also authorized to hold up to 
US$10 million for such purposes. 2. The foreign exchange 
allowance for emigrants was raised to US$200,000 a household 
for current expenses and to US$300,000 for investment 
purposes. 
November. 1. The limit for overseas investments by 
Korean residents subject to automatic approval was raised 
from US$1 million to US$2 million. 2. South Korea formally 
accepted the obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2-4 of 
the International Monetary Fund Agreement. This obligated 
Korea to eliminate its remaining restriction on payments and 
transfers for current account transactions. 
February. Requirements on overseas investment were 
liberalized. Besides the abolition of the requirement 
concerning the credit standing of investors, the minimum 
equity investment ratio was lowered to 20 percent, and the 
minimum interest rate for long-term loans was removed. 
July. Nonresidents received permission to freely invest 
in six manufacturing sectors, regardless of their equity 
ratio, and the amount of new foreign investments permitted 
without reference to the capital review committee was 
increased to US$5 million from US$ 3 million. 
January. The ceiling on the value of the foreign 
investment subject to automatic approval was raised to US$ 
100 million from US$ 3 million. 
March. The limits on foreign exchange holdings for 
investment in foreign securities by domestic securities 
firms authorized to handle international business were 
increased to US$50 million from US$ 30 million, and by 
insurance and investment firms, to US$30 million from US$10 
million. 
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Taiwan's Financial Sector Policies 
1979-1991 
February. 1. The foreign exchange market was 
established and a managed float was adopted. 2. The spot 
central rate of the U.S. dollar against the NT dollar 
henceforth to be set daily by 5 major authorized banks on 
the basis of the weighted average of interbank transaction 
rates on the previous business day. 
January. Privately held foreign currency deposits in 
authorized banks were permitted. 
March. Daily exchange rate ceiling was abandoned by 
Central Bank. 
November. 1. A committee of the Banker's Association 
was authorized to set, on a monthly basis, actual deposit 
and loan rates within ceilings determined by the Central 
Bank. The Central Bank set maximum deposit rates and 
maximum and minimum loan rates. 2. Interest rates on 
commercial paper, bankers' acceptances and Treasury bills 
were fully liberalized. 
September. Central rate trading system was established 
in the foreign exchange market with the exchange rate to be 
based on the daily weighted average exchange rate of 
interbank trading. 
December. Offshore Banking Statutes were established 
allowing local banks to engage in offshore banking business. 
August. Bank restrictions on the holding of long 
positions in foreign currencies was removed. 
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November. Range of maximum and minimum loan rates were 
widened by the Central Bank. 
March. Banks were allowed to set prime rate according to 
market conditions. 
August. 1. Banks were allowed to set own rates on 
foreign currency deposits. 2. Banker's association to set 
the range of maximum and minimum lending rates while the 
in~ividual banks were allowed to charge customer rates based 
on credit rating and loan maturity date. 
September. The "Regulations for Interest Rate 
Management", which prohibited the maximum deposit rate from 
exceeding the minimum loan rate were abolished. 
November. The "central interbank call rate system" was 
abolished, which gave each bank complete freedom in 
determining its own call rate. 
October. Allowed foreign banks to set up second branches 
in Taiwan. 
May. The Central Bank freezed the outstanding amount of 
commercial banks' foreign liabilities at US$ 13.8 billion, 
the level of May 31, 1987. 
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June. Foreign banks were permitted to join the local 
inter-bank remittance system and the interbank ATM sharing 
system. 
July. Current account transactions were completely 
liberalized on July 15. Requirements to surrender export 
proceeds, advanced import deposits and restrictions on 
payments for invisibles were lifted. An individual or a 
company was allowed to purchase and remit outward up to an 
annual limit of US$5 million. A ceiling on inward 
remittances for each person was set at US$ 50,000 per year. 
October. The Central Bank lifted the freeze on banks' 
foreign liabilities on October 1, 1987. Following capital 
inflow of $3 billion, the Central Bank reimposed a freeze at 
$16.2 billion on October 2. Borrowing of foreign exchange 
by nonbanks was not subject to the freeze. 
January. The revision of the Securities and Exchange Law 
lifted the restriction on the establishment of new 
securities companies in Taiwan. 
November. The Ministry of Finance lifted restrictions 
limiting the total number of domestic bank branches that can 
be established in a given foreign city. 
April. A new system of foreign exchange trading was 
established, based on bid-ask quotations. The new system 
applies to interbank trading and retail trading over US$ 
10,000. The previous limits on daily fluctuations of the 
interbank rate were rescinded. 
July. 1. The ceiling for inward remittances for each 
person was raised to US$ 200,000 on July 20. 2. All 
remaining regulations controlling maximum deposit rates and 
maximum and minimum loan rates were eliminated. 
August. Foreign exchange interbank call loan market was 
established. 
September. Annual capital inflow was increased from 
US$200,000 to US$ 500,000 per person. 
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November. Capital inflow limitation was increased to US$ 
1 million. 
June. The Ministry of Finance approved fifteen 
applications for new banks, which ended a ban of several 
decades on new institutions in the industry. 
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